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IV. REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
This appeal arises from a summary judgment for the Defendant 
lawyers on the grounds of proximate cause in a $23 million legal 
malpractice action of some complexity. The appeal presents 
important issues on the potential scope of lawyer liability. 
Plaintiff-Appellants, in seeking reversal, have for the first time 
proposed a new rule of proximate cause in legal malpractice actions 
— a "things would have been different" rule of proximate cause, 
that would make lawyers nothing less than guarantors of their 
clients' business and legal expectations. The Appellants' proposed 
rule is contrary to Utah law and the Restatement. Appellees, 
therefore, respectfully request oral argument. 
V. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to sections 78-2-2(4) and 
78-2a-3(2)(k) of the Utah Code, and Rules 3(a) and 4, of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
VI. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did Plaintiffs demonstrate a genuine issue of fact on the 
essential element of proximate cause when all the damages 
Plaintiffs specified and claimed arose out of seven business 
transactions between Plaintiffs and Northstar Communications, Inc. 
("Northstar"), and Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"), non-
party business entities, and every element of those seven business 
transactions of which Plaintiffs complained and for which 
Plaintiffs claimed damage was exclusively the product and result of 
business decisions and directions by those non-party business 
entities and not the Defendant lawyers? 
2* Did Plaintiffs demonstrate a genuine issue of fact on the 
essential element of proximate cause when all the damages 
Plaintiffs claimed were premised on the award of the FCC license 
for Channel 13 to Plaintiffs, and on the uncontroverted facts 
Plaintiffs, after one year of seeking a financial partner to buy 
out competing applicants for Channel 13 including the competing 
applicant who had been awarded the license by the FCC, never 
obtained a commitment or even a proposal that would have provided 
the financing necessary to buy out the competing applicants and 
obtain the license on which Plaintiffs based their damage claims — 
Plaintiffs simply failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood 
that, absent the Defendant lawyers' breach of duty, they would have 
achieved the better business result for which they claimed damages? 
3. Did Plaintiffs demonstrate a genuine issue of fact on the 
essential element of proximate cause when a finder of fact could 
only conclude that Plaintiffs had their own lawyer every step of 
the way in their dealings with Northstar and Allstate from July of 
1986 until this action was filed, and had their own legal 
representation in all seven business transactions with Northstar 
and Allstate for which they claimed damages? 
4. Did Plaintiffs demonstrate a genuine issue of fact on the 
essential element of proximate cause by argument, accusation and 
speculation as to whether the Defendant lawyers had used or misused 
confidential information of Plaintiffs when, on the clear 
uncontroverted record after two years of discovery, there was 
absolutely no showing of any use or misuse of confidential 
information of Plaintiffs? 
2 
The standard of review for each of these issues is the same 
standard as that used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment — the Appellate Court reviews the facts, and the 
inferences drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the losing 
party. If the Appellate Court concludes there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact, the Appellate Court reviews the trial 
court's conclusions of law for correctness. See Hunt v. ESI 
Engineering Inc., 808 P.2d 1137, 1139 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991); English v. Kienke. 774 P.2d 1154, 
1156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd. 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993). 
VII. DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION IN 
COURT BELOW. 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment awarded to the 
Defendant lawyers in a legal malpractice action, (R. 12375-82. )1 
Plaintiffs sought more than $23 million in damages relating 
exclusively to their failed business expectations from a venture to 
acquire a VHF license for Channel 13 in Salt Lake City. (R. 20-38, 
7173.) Simply put, Plaintiffs lost because they failed to 
demonstrate a genuine issue of fact on the essential bridge of 
proximate cause between their claims of fault and damage, (R. 12375-
81.) 
1. The principle documents and testimony cited in the Defendant lawyers' 
brief are in their Addendum ("Defs.' Add.") filed herewith. The documents and 
testimony in the Addendum are arranged according to their record number, and are 
indexed by name and record number for the Court's convenience. Both the record 
number and Addendum exhibit number are cited at pages 5-13 of this Brief; 
thereafter, the cite generally is only to the record number. 
3 
Defendants Richard Wiley and his firm, Wiley, Rein & Fielding 
("Wiley Rein"), are, of course, lawyers. (R. 21, 3390.) The 
Defendants, as Plaintiffs correctly contend, represented Plaintiffs 
in a venture to acquire the VHF license for Channel 13 in 
competitive proceedings before the FCC. (R. 3390-91, 3410, 3419-25.) Two 
of the Plaintiffs — David Lee and Clayton Fouiger — are also 
lawyers, a fact Appellants failed to point out. (R. 3425, 10446; 
c. Fouiger Dep. at 5-6.) Lee is the senior partner in the Washington 
office of the Salt Lake firm of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
where, since September 1987, he has been the partner of his old 
classmate Barry Wood, the lawyer who primarily represented 
Plaintiffs in their quest for an FCC license from 1981 to December 
1986. (R. 3419-25.) Mr. Wood, who did the FCC work, is not a party 
Defendant, but Mr. Wiley, who only performed .25 hours of legal 
services for Plaintiffs in that entire six-year period, is. (R. 20, 
3390-91, 3410, 3419-25.) 
Fundamentally, this is a lawsuit against lawyers by 
Plaintiffs, two of whom are lawyers and all of whom were 
represented by their own lawyers, for breach of lawyers' duties — 
conflict of interest — that seeks as damages, business damages for 
Plaintiffs' failed business expectations that were proximately 
caused, if damages they be, by Northstar and Allstate, business 
entities that are not parties to this action. Plaintiffs lost 
because, while there were controverted facts on the issue of breach 
of professional duty, there was no genuine issue of fact that any 
demonstrated breach of duty by the Defendant lawyers proximately 
caused the damages Plaintiffs claimed. 
4 
The Defendant lawyers were awarded summary judgment on the 
issue of proximate cause. The Court will note that Plaintiffs, 
with all their polemics, have failed to point out the 
uncontroverted facts germane to the correctness of that ruling. 
(R. 3327-37.) The critical facts, controverted and uncontroverted, 
are: 
1. The uncontroverted fact was that by January 1986, 
Plaintiffs had lost their quest to acquire the VHF license for 
Channel 13. Plaintiffs formed a venture to participate as a 
competing applicant for the award of Channel 13 commencing in 1981. 
Plaintiffs were unsuccessful. By the end of 1985, an 
administrative law judge had entered a decision awarding the 
license to another applicant. This decision had been affirmed by 
the FCC, and Plaintiffs7 only remaining hope was the unlikely 
prospect of further appeal, (R. 3420-22 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 4), R. 5319-21.) 
2. The uncontroverted fact was that Barry Wood and his firm, 
Wiley Rein, represented Plaintiffs in their quest for Channel 13 
b e f o r e t h e FCC. (R. 3410 ( D e f s . ' Add. Ex. 3 ) , 3420-24 ( D e f s . ' Add. Ex. 4 ) . ) 
3. Plaintiffs demonstrated a genuine issue of fact as to 
whether the Defendant lawyers, in view of their representation of 
Plaintiffs, had breached their professional duties by representing 
Northstar with regard to its interest in providing financing in 
Plaintiffs' Channel 13 venture without Plaintiffs' informed consent 
to that conflicting representation. In July 1986, at a time when 
Plaintiffs were actively engaged in pursuing financing to buy out 
the competing applicants for Channel 13 including the winning 
applicant, the Defendant lawyers, through Barry Wood, 
incontrovertibly requested Plaintiffs' consent to the Defendant 
5 
lawyers' representation of Northstar. The request the Defendant 
lawyers made was that they would represent Northstar in its 
dealings with Plaintiffs, but continue to represent Plaintiffs 
before the FCC. The Defendant lawyers thus sought Plaintiffs7 
consent to represent Northstar in its dealings with Plaintiffs, 
while representing both Northstar and Plaintiffs' interest before 
the FCC where they shared a common interest, (R. 3390-91 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 
1), 3411-12 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 3), 3422-24 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 4), 10726-27, 10738-39, 
10744-45, 10789-90, 10864, 10883.) 
Barry Wood unequivocally testified he obtained Plaintiffs' 
C o n s e n t . (R. 3423-24 ( D e f s . ' Add. Ex. 4 ) , 10651-71 , 10690-91 . ) P l a i n t i f f 
Joseph Lee testified he refused to consent to the Defendant 
lawyers' representation of Northstar. (R. 4959-60.) Mr. Wood's 
testimony was confirmed by the facts: (1) Plaintiffs immediately 
went out and retained their own lawyer, Ralph Hardy, of the 
Washington law firm of Dow, Lohnes & Albertson ("Dow Lohnes"); (2) 
Mr. Hardy, from July 15, 1986 on, represented Plaintiffs for over 
four years in every transaction in which Plaintiffs and Northstar 
had adverse interests while the Defendant lawyers, in those 
transactions, represented Northstar; and (3) in that entire four-
year period, Plaintiffs' new lawyers never once complained or 
intimated that the Defendant lawyers had any conflict of interest 
in their representation of Northstar. (R. 3412-13 (Defs.' Add. EX. 3), 
3424-25 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 4), 3451 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 5), 3457-60 (id.), 3559 (Defs.' 
Add. Ex. 6), 3565-66 (id.), 3568-70 (id.), 3696-97 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 7), 3702-04, 
7278, 7451-568 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 11), 7469-8294, 8339-9495, 9624-9777, 9827-9954, 
10054-248, 10458, 10744-46, 10799-800, 10808-09, 10864-66, 10883, 10903-04, 10981-
82; Defs.' Add. Ex. 11 (Vol I) at 143-47, 166, 195, 221-28; id^ _ (Vol. II) at 7-8, 
19, 41, 45-46) But, the Defendant lawyers conceded, for purposes of 
6 
their motion for summary judgment, that Mr. Lee's testimony created 
a genuine issue of fact on the issue of breach of professional 
duty. (R. 3330-31.) 
4. Incontrovertibly, all Plaintiffs' damages, every dime 
claimed, arose out of seven business transactions between 
Plaintiffs, Northstar and Allstate. Incontrovertibly, all 
Plaintiffs' damages with regard to these seven transactions were 
specified by Plaintiffs in answers to interrogatories, answers 
Plaintiffs never sought to amend. Incontrovertibly, all damages 
sought by Plaintiffs were founded on the fundamental assumption 
that Plaintiffs were successful in acquiring the license for 
Channel 13 or, to put the matter conversely, if Plaintiffs had not 
been successful, Plaintiffs would not have sustained any of the 
d a m a g e s t h e y C l a i m e d . (R. 20 -38 , 3997, 7173 ( D e f s . ' Add. Ex. 9 ) , 7180-98; 
P i s . ' Deps. f i l e d pursuant to Court Order a t R. 3843-44 . ) 
The seven business transactions, the only transactions, 
between Plaintiffs on one side and Northstar and Allstate on the 
other side were: (1) the "MWT Ltd. Transaction" — the initial 
arrangement between Northstar, Allstate and Plaintiffs late in 
November 1986 to provide the financing necessary to acquire the 
Channel 13 license through settlements with the competing 
applicants and for construction and initial operation of Channel 
13, which is reflected in a Credit Agreement and the MWT Ltd. 
Amended and Restated Agreement of Ltd. Partnership, dated as of 
November 18, 1986; (2) the "Adams Transaction" in the fall of 1987 
— MWT Ltd.'s purchase of Channel 20, an independent UHF station in 
the Salt Lake market, from Adams T.V. of Salt Lake City, Inc. 
("Adams") , for $30 million and the financing of that purchase 
7 
through a $22.5 million senior secured note to Aetna Life Insurance 
Company ("Aetna"); (3) Northstar's conversion from a limited 
partner to the sole general partner of MWT Ltd. pursuant to the MWT 
Ltd. agreements in May 1988; (4) Northstar's suspension of payments 
under Plaintiffs Jo-Ann Kilpatrick/s/ Sidney Foulger's and George 
Gonzales7 employment contracts with MWT Ltd. in January 1989, and 
the similar suspension of Plaintiff Joseph Lee's employment 
contract in June 1989; (5) a 1988 dispute over whether MWT Ltd. 
should pay 25% interest and sign a management contract with 
Farragut Communications Inc. ("Farragut"), the holding company of 
Northstar, which had been organized in November 1987, to obtain 
loans from Allstate to meet MWT Ltd.'s then delinquent obligations 
to Adams and Aetna; (6) MWT Ltd.'s sale of Channel 13 to Fox 
Television Stations Inc. ("Fox"), for $41 million in April 1990; 
and (7) MWT Ltd.'s cash calls on December 30, 1991, calls which 
were never paid, to make up deficiencies in each partner's capital 
account upon MWT Ltd.'s dissolution, again as provided in the MWT 
Ltd. Amended and Restated Agreement of Limited Partnership, (R. 20-
38# 3327-29, 3997; Pis.' Deps. filed pursuant to Court Order at R. 3843-44.) 
The damages arising from these seven transactions claimed by 
Plaintiffs, as specified in their answers to interrogatories, were: 
(1) the fair-market value of a 40% interest in Channel 13 in 1987 -
- $9,530,000; (2) lost cash disbursements from the operation of 
Channel 13, 1987-1993 — $4,377,000; (3) 40% of the difference 
between the 1993 fair-market value of Channel 13 and the fair-
market value of Channel 13 in 1987 — $5,986,000; (4) Plaintiffs' 
lost capital contributions to the Channel 13 venture — $239,446; 
(5) Plaintiffs' expenses on the Channel 13 venture — $10,848.76; 
8 
(6) legal expenses paid by Joseph Lee to Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall 
& McCarthy for its preparation of Lee's employment contract with 
Channel 13 and gifts of MWT Ltd. & MWT Corp. ownership interests — 
$3,000; (7) amounts not paid by MWT Ltd. under employment contracts 
with Channel 13, 1989-1992 — $939,145.71; (8) Mr. Gonzales' loss 
of a car under his employment contract with Channel 13, 1989-1991 -
- $14,400; (9) Mr. Gonzales' IRA penalty regarding the termination 
of his employment contract with Channel 13 — $1,900; and (10) cash 
calls made by Northstar on December 30, 1991, again, calls that 
were never paid — $2,007,132.82. (R. 7173 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 9), 7180-98.) 
All these claimed damages relate exclusively to Plaintiffs' 
failed business expectations with regard to their Channel 13 
venture with Northstar and Allstate, and frame the fundamental 
issue of proximate cause: Did the fault shown proximately cause the 
damages claimed? 
5. The Defendant lawyers put an uncontroverted and 
uncontradicted record before the lower court which established that 
every element — every single thing — of which Plaintiffs 
complained and for which they sought damages with regard to the 
seven business transactions between Plaintiffs, Northstar and 
Allstate, was solely the product and result of the business 
decisions and directions by Northstar and Allstate, business 
entities which are not parties to this litigation, and were not the 
product or result of any decision or direction by any of the 
Defendant lawyers. In the MWT Ltd. Transaction, for example, 
Plaintiffs complained of their proportionate ownership interest, 
the amount of financing, and the right of Northstar to convert to 
become the general partner of MWT Ltd. Each of these elements, 
9 
however, was solely the product of decisions made by the management 
of Northstar and Allstate, and the Defendant lawyers had nothing to 
do with determining Plaintiffs' relative ownership, the amount of 
financing, or Northstar's right of conversion under the MWT Ltd. 
T r a n s a c t i o n . (R. 3 3 3 4 - 3 6 , 3 3 9 2 - 9 6 (Beta.' Add. Ex . 1)
 # 3 4 0 4 - 0 6 ( D e f s . ' Add. Ex . 
2 ) , 3 4 1 3 - 1 6 ( D e f s . ' Add. Ex. 3 ) , 3 4 5 0 - 6 0 ( D e f s . ' Add. Ex . 5 ) , 3556 ( D e f s . ' Add. Ex. 
6 ) , 3 5 5 9 - 6 2 ( i d . ) , 3 5 6 5 - 7 1 ( i d . ) , 3 6 9 6 - 3 7 0 6 ( D e f s . ' Add. Ex . 7 ) , 7 2 7 1 . ) 
6. There was simply no genuine issue of fact that Plaintiffs 
were represented by their own lawyers every step of the way from 
July 1986 through the sale of Channel 13 to Fox in April 1990 with 
regard to all their dealings with Northstar and Allstate. 
Plaintiffs were represented by their own lawyers, Dow Lohnes, and 
a senior partner of that firm, Ralph Hardy, in every one of the 
seven business transactions between Plaintiffs, Northstar and 
Allstate. Dow Lohnes and Ralph Hardy's competence in the discharge 
of their responsibilities was unquestioned by Plaintiffs. (Pis.# Br. 
at 45.) Some Plaintiffs denied, however, that Dow Lohnes and Ralph 
Hardy represented Plaintiffs as their lawyer and denied, in 
particular, Dow Lohnes and Ralph Hardy represented Plaintiffs as 
their lawyers in the MWT Ltd. Transaction in November 1986. (icL. at 
13.) But, Dow Lohnes and Ralph Hardy's representation of Plaintiffs 
in every transaction is incontrovertibly established by: (1) Ralph 
Hardy's testimony; (2) Dow Lohnes' billing records; (3) the role 
performed by Dow Lohnes in each of the transactions; (4) the 
documents drafted and reviewed by Dow Lohnes including the 
settlement agreements between Plaintiffs and the other competing 
applicants for Channel 13; (5) the letters written by Dow Lohnes to 
the Defendant lawyers, Northstar and Allstate; and (6) what is 
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literally a stack of exhibits that is two feet thick which 
reflects, exhibit after exhibit, the legal services performed by 
DOW L o h n e S f o r P l a i n t i f f s . (R. 3 4 1 2 - 1 3 ( D e f s . ' Add. Ex. 3 ) , 3 4 2 3 - 2 5 ( D e f s . ' 
Add. Ex . 4 ) , 3 4 5 1 ( D e f s . f Add. Ex. 5 . ) , 3 4 5 7 - 6 0 ( i d . ) , 3559 ( D e f s . # Add. Ex . 6 ) , 
3 5 6 5 - 6 6 ( i d . ) , 3 5 6 8 - 7 0 ( i d . ) , 3 6 9 6 - 9 7 ( D e f s . ' Add. Ex. 7) , 3 7 0 2 - 0 4 , 7 2 8 2 - 8 3 , 7 4 5 1 -
8 2 9 1 ( D e f s . ' Add. E x s . 1 1 - 1 2 ) , 8 3 3 9 - 9 4 9 5 ( D e f s . ' Add. Ex. 1 2 ) , 9 6 2 4 - 9 7 7 7 , 9 8 2 7 - 9 9 5 4 , 
1 0 0 5 4 - 2 4 8 , 1 0 2 3 7 - 4 8 ( D e f s . ' Add. Ex. 1 2 ) , 1 0 4 5 8 , 1 0 6 9 4 - 9 5 , 1 0 7 0 4 , 1 0 7 0 6 , 1 0 7 4 5 - 4 7 , 
1 0 7 5 7 , 1 0 7 6 0 - 6 1 , 1 0 7 7 4 , 1 0 7 7 6 , 1 0 7 8 0 - 8 1 , 1 0 7 8 5 , 1 0 7 8 7 - 8 9 , 1 0 7 9 2 , 1 0 7 9 4 - 9 5 , 1 0 7 9 9 -
8 0 0 , 1 0 8 0 8 - 0 9 , 1 0 8 6 2 - 6 4 , 1 0 8 8 3 , 1 0 9 0 3 - 0 4 , 1 0 9 8 1 - 8 2 ; D e f s Add. Ex . 11 ( V o l . I ) a t 
1 4 3 - 4 7 , 1 6 6 , 1 9 5 , 2 2 1 - 2 8 ; id^_ ( V o l . I I ) a t 7 - 8 , 1 9 , 4 1 , 4 5 - 4 6 . ) 
Indeed, every exhibit, every document relating to the services 
of Dow Lohnes, supports the conclusion that Dow Lohnes and Ralph 
Hardy provided Plaintiffs with legal representation and not merely 
financial advice. There is not one exhibit, not one document, not 
one piece of paper, to the contrary. There was no genuine issue of 
fact as to whether Plaintiffs had their own lawyers because no 
reasonable finder of fact could find other than that Plaintiffs had 
their own competent legal representation in their dealings with 
Northstar and Allstate. Plaintiffs' attempt to raise an issue of 
fact as to whether they had their own legal representation not only 
fails, but shows Appellants7 desperate attempt to sustain this 
malpractice action against these Defendant lawyers. 
7. Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate there was a reasonable 
likelihood they could have obtained the necessary financing for 
Channel 13 from CPL or any source other than Northstar and 
Allstate. Plaintiffs thus failed to establish a genuine issue of 
fact that there was a reasonable likelihood that Plaintiffs, in the 
absence of the Defendant lawyers7 alleged breach of their 
professional duties, could have obtained the better business 
11 
result, the acquisition of Channel 13, for which Plaintiffs claimed 
damages. CPL never made a commitment to provide financing to 
Plaintiffs. It only made a proposal, (R. 7080 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 8).) 
CPL's proposal would have only provided CPL funds of $2 million, 
which was not enough to even fund the settlements with the 
competing applicants, and Plaintiffs incontrovertibly rejected the 
CPL proposal with the advice of Dow Lohnes and Ralph Hardy, (R. 3434-
43 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 4), 5447-48, 7080 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 8), 7208-30 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 
10), 7284-86, 7481-87 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 11), 7508-09 (id.), 7806, 8278-92 (Defs.' 
Add. Ex. 12); J. Lee Dep. at 189-93; Dep. Exs. D-225-26 (Defs.' Add. Exs. 13-14); 
Defs.' Add. Exs. 16-17.) 
8. The uncontroverted record established that the Defendant 
lawyers never used or misused any confidential information of 
Plaintiffs. After two years of full discovery, Plaintiffs simply 
failed to raise any genuine issue of fact as to whether the 
Defendant lawyers had used or misused any confidential information 
in any of the dealings between Plaintiffs, Northstar and Allstate. 
The Defendant lawyers put in a clear and categorical record that 
they never used or misused any confidential information. 
Plaintiffs never controverted or contradicted that record and were 
never able to point to one single piece of confidential information 
used or misused by the Defendant lawyers. The information 
Northstar and Allstate received regarding Plaintiffs were received 
from Plaintiffs as Plaintiffs attempted to persuade them to finance 
the Channel 13 venture. Furthermore, all the information relative 
to Plaintiffs was a matter of public record which Plaintiffs had 
made in pursuit of their application for the Channel 13 license 
before the FCC. Plaintiffs simply failed to point to one single 
piece of information that was not part of the public record or that 
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Plaintiffs themselves had not directly made available to Northstar 
and Allstate. Certainly, in seeking millions of dollars of 
financing to pay for settlements with competing applicants, 
Plaintiffs disclosed the terms of those settlements to the business 
parties they were requesting to finance the settlements, (R. 3391-92 
(Defs.' Add. Ex. 1), 3413 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 3), 3415 (id.), 3421 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 4), 
3424 (id^), 3453 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 5), 3560-61 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 6), 3698-99 (Defs.' 
Add. Ex. 7), 7524-32 (Defs.' Add. Ex. 11), 7538-39 (id.), 10453-56, 10591-92, 10550-
51, 10606, 10627, 10636, 10700-01, 10755.) 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS, 
1. The FCC Proceeding For Channel 13. 
In 1980, the FCC approved a new VHF drop-in channel, Channel 
13, in the Salt Lake market, (R. 3555.) The individual Plaintiffs 
("Mountain West Partners" or "Partners"), organized Mountain West 
Television Company ("Mountain West"), a Utah general partnership, 
to seek the license for Channel 13 as a competing applicant in the 
comparative hearing process before the FCC. (R. 3410, 3420-21.) There 
were four other competing applicants, (R. 3421, 3555.) 
In the FCC proceedings, Mountain West presented Plaintiff 
Joseph Lee, a long time figure in the Utah broadcasting industry, 
as the person providing Mountain West with broadcasting experience, 
and the Foulger Group, successful Washington, D.C. businessmen with 
Utah connections, as providing the financial resources for the 
Mountain West application, (R. 7237-58; Dep. Ex. D-IO.) The Foulger 
Group filed detailed financial information with the FCC. (R. 7237-58, 
7524-25, 10591-92.) All the Partners filed detailed personal 
information, (R. 23-24, 7524, 10453-54, 10606, 10627, 10700-01; Dep. Ex. D-IO.) 
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In May 1985, the FCC Administrative Law Judge awarded the 
Channel 13 license to Salt Lake City Family Television, Inc. 
("Family") , and ranked Mountain West second. (R. 3421; Dep. Ex. D-IO.) 
The FCC Review Board affirmed the award to Family in December 1985. 
(R. 3422.) These adverse decisions left Mountain West with two 
alternatives: (1) the unlikely prospect of further appeal, or (2) 
settling with the other applicants. (R. 5319-21.) 
2. The 1986 Settlements And Search For Financing. 
After losing, the Partners decided to attempt to buy out the 
four other competing applicants to obtain the Channel 13 license. 
(R. 3422# 7475-77.) They also decided to seek a financing partner to 
pay for these settlements and provide additional financing for the 
Channel 13 venture, even though the Foulger Group had that 
C a p a b i l i t y . 2 (R. 3422, 7248, 7369, 7475-77; D e f s . ' Add. Exs . 15 . ) 
During 1986, the Mountain West Partners engaged in extensive 
efforts to find financing, contacting numerous sources including 
Neuberger & Berman, J. H. Foster & Company, Halcyon Investments, 
Communications Partners Ltd. ("CPL"), American Television of Utah 
(Skaggs) , Belo, First Chicago, and Northstar. (R. 3422-23, 7284-86, 
7481-88, 7806, 7826-29, 8278-81; J. Lee Dep. at 189-93; Defs. ' Add. Ex. 16.) 
Northstar and other potential investors, from the inception, made 
it clear they would only consider providing financing for the 
Channel 13 venture on the condition Mountain West reach global 
settlements with the competing applicants, (R. 3558, 3697, 10812.) No 
2. Sidney Foulger and the other members of the Foulger family who are 
Plaintiffs are affluent and sophisticated businessmen who, among other things, 
are the principal owners of the Crossroads Mall in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 
7248, 10585; Defs.' Add. Ex. 15.) 
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one was going to provide financing unless they could be assured of 
obtaining the license, (id.) 
Pursuant to their plan to settle and seek outside financing, 
the Partners negotiated settlements with the other applicants 
during the summer and fall of 1986. (R. 3434-41, 3558, 7204-30; Defs.' Add. 
Exs. 13-14.) The Foulger Group, through Plaintiff Brent Pratt, 
spearheaded the negotiations, (R. 7529-30, 10674-780, 10812.) Barry Wood 
and Dow Lohnes represented Plaintiffs in the settlement 
negotiations, and reviewed the settlement agreements before 
e x e c u t i o n . (R. 7366-69 , 7533-39 , 7807-27 , 7850-53 , 8113-8133, 8189-95 , 8198-99, 
8282-86; Defs.' Add. Ex. li (vol. i) at 166.) Mountain West agreed to pay 
Family, the winning applicant, $2 million and the other three 
applicants $1 million each.3 (R. 3434-41, 3649, 7204-30,- Defs.' Add. EXS. 
13-14.) 
P l a i n t i f f s did not make any claim or seek any damages for the 
se t t l ement agreements, (R. 20-38.) They did not do so for good 
reason. F i r s t , there was no c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t regarding the 
agreements with competing app l i cant s . Second, without the 
se t t l ement agreements, P l a i n t i f f s would never have acquired the 
Channel 13 l i c e n s e — the foundation for a l l P l a i n t i f f s ' damage 
c la ims , (R. 7173, 7180-98.) Third, P l a i n t i f f s ' expert , Mr. Schutz, 
t e s t i f i e d the terms of the se t t lement agreements were reasonable . 
(D. schutz Dep. at 56.) Indeed, i f P l a i n t i f f s had paid too much in 
3. The Family set t lement , which was signed on October 6, 1986, required the 
$2 m i l l i o n be put in escrow by November 17 , 1986, or a $150,000 penalty would be 
imposed and the sett lement voided. (R. 7208-30.) The other sett lement 
agreements required $1.3 mi l l i on of the t o t a l be paid the e a r l i e r of December 31/ 
1986f or ten days a f ter Mountain West was awarded the l i c e n s e . (R. 3430-44; 
D e f s . ' Add. Exs. 13-14.) 
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settlement, overpayment would have been an independent cause for 
the failure of the Channel 13 venture. 
3. The Seven Business Transactions Between Plaintiffs, Northstar 
And Allstate. 
The MWT Ltd. Transaction 
In the early summer of 1986, Northstar, a company engaged in 
the business of acquiring and operating broadcast properties, 
became interested in entering into a financing arrangement with 
Mountain West to acquire the Channel 13 license, (R. 3552, 3555-58.) 
Northstar was backed financially by Allstate.4 (R. 3694-95.) At that 
time, William Lincoln, one of the founders of Northstar, was its 
President, and Katherine Glakas ("Glakas"), another founder, was 
the Vice President. (R. 3551-53.) The Allstate representative 
responsible for dealing with Northstar in 1986 was Paul Renze 
("Renze"). (R. 3694-95.) 
During the summer and fall of 1986, Lincoln, Glakas and Renze 
had discussions with the Mountain West Partners and their lawyer, 
R a l p h H a r d y . (R. 3 4 5 0 - 5 1 , 3 5 5 6 - 5 8 , 3 6 9 6 - 9 7 , 7 4 8 7 - 8 8 , 7 4 9 0 - 9 4 , 7 5 0 3 , 7 5 0 5 , 8 2 7 9 -
85.) Northstar and Allstate, however, did not commit to provide any 
financing for the Channel 13 venture until the end of November 
1986, after the Mountain West Partners had settled with the 
C o m p e t i n g a p p l i c a n t s . (R. 3 4 5 0 - 5 3 , 3 5 5 6 - 6 0 , 3 6 9 6 - 9 8 , 7 3 6 6 - 6 9 , 7 5 0 7 , 7 5 1 4 - 2 0 ; 
D e f s . ' Add. Ex. 11 ( V o l . I ) a t 1 4 5 - 4 7 . ) 
In November 1986, Northstar and the Partners began face-to-
face negotiations at Wiley Rein's law offices in Washington, D.C. 
4. At the time of the MWT Ltd. Transaction, Allstate owned all the 
preferred stock of Northstar, which was convertible into 80% of the common stock. 
Lincoln, Glakas and several other third parties owned all the issued common 
stock. Although Allstate had not converted its preferred stock to common stock, 
Allstate required its approval for any deal with Northstar because it provided 
Northstar's funding. (See R. 10688-89.) 
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(R. 3451, 3558-59 , 3697, 7507, 7514-20, 8285-87 . ) T h e M o u n t a i n W e s t 
Partners—Clayton Foulger, David Lee and Brent Pratt, two of whom 
were lawyers—and their three Dow Lohnes lawyers—Hardy, David Wild 
and Timothy Kelley, sat on one side of the table. On the other 
side were the Northstar principals, Lincoln and Glakas, with 
Northstar's three Wiley Rein lawyers—John Quale, Merilyn Strailman 
and Timothy Danello. (R. 3451, 3558-59, 7514-20, 10767.) Renze did not 
attend, but was in constant contact with Lincoln by telephone, (R. 
3558, 3697.) 
At these negotiations, the Mountain West Partners, Northstar's 
management, and Allstate finally reached an agreement. Their 
agreement is reflected in a Credit Agreement and a Partnership 
Agreement ("MWT Ltd. Transaction"), (R. 3606-93.) Under the terms of 
the MWT Ltd. Transaction, a newly formed limited partnership, MWT 
Ltd. , was to own the Channel 13 license. Northstar would own 49% 
of MWT Ltd., and the Mountain West Partners and their newly 
organized corporation, MWT Corp., would own 51%. (R. 3562-63.) 
Initially MWT Ltd.'s sole general partner was MWT Corp., but 
Northstar had the option, after the station went on the air, to 
convert to the general partner, (R. 3653-55, 3661-63.) 
In return for its 49% interest, Northstar and Allstate were to 
provide $6 million in financing, (R. 3563, 3700-01.) Northstar was 
also required, if additional funding was necessary after it became 
the general partner, to use its "best efforts" to secure non-
recourse financing, (id.) The Foulger Group also agreed to provide 
financing to MWT Ltd. Sydney Foulger agreed to provide $2.7 
million in financing in return for a 21% Class A limited 
partnership interest, (id.) The Mountain West Partners and their 
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corporation, MWT Corp., were required only to contribute Mountain 
West's application for the Channel 13 license in exchange for their 
Class B interest, and their attorneys' fees were paid by their 
financing partners, Northstar and Allstate, (R. 3649, 3701.) 
On November 20, 1986, Northstar, Allstate and Mountain West 
consummated the transaction, (R. 3561, 7519.) On December 18, 1986, 
pursuant to the settlement agreements and the MWT Ltd. Transaction, 
the FCC awarded the Channel 13 license to MWT Ltd. (R. 3564.) 
The Adams Transaction 
At a meeting in Salt Lake in February 1987, Clayton Foulger 
unexpectedly announced Sidney Foulger would not provide the $2.7 
million in financing he had previously agreed to. (R. 3454, 3564, 3702, 
7231.) His decision surprised everyone, (id.) Without these funds, 
MWT Ltd. did not have the money to build the station.5 (R. 3564, 3702, 
10479.) 
Two days after Mr. Foulger's announcement, Plaintiffs, who 
controlled MWT Corp., the general partner of MWT Ltd., Lincoln and 
Renze met with Plaintiffs' lawyer, Ralph Hardy, in Salt Lake to 
consider their options. (R. 3565, 3702-03, 7232-36.) All the 
participants, including the Mountain West Partners, unanimously 
decided to put Channel 13 on the air by acquiring the assets of 
Channel 20, an independent UHF station already serving the Salt 
Lake market, (id.) That afternoon, Ralph Hardy, on behalf of MWT 
Corp. and MWT Ltd., sent an offer to the owner of Channel 20, 
5. Northstar—still a limited partner—had met all its financing 
commitments for the Channel 13 venture. It was difficult to obtain further 
financing for the construction of a stand-alone station, particularly in Salt 
Lake where there were 3 VHF stations and an independent UHF station, Channel 20, 
already on the air, and a new UHF station—Channel 14—had been approved, but not 
built. (R. 3564-65, 7540-41.) 
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Adams, to purchase Channel 20 for $30 million. (icL.,- R. 7549-50, 8354-
56.) The Defendant lawyers were not consulted or even present at 
the Salt Lake meetings, (R. 3565, 3702-03, 7232-36.) Hardy not only 
drafted the initial offer for Channel 20, which Plaintiff Joseph 
Lee signed on behalf of MWT Corp., but Dow Lohnes represented MWT 
Corp. and MWT Ltd. in all negotiations to purchase Channel 20. (R. 
3425, 3454-55, 3565-66, 3703, 7545, 8354-56, 8359-9116, 9414-72.) 
The Mountain West Partners, Ralph Hardy, and Lincoln all 
looked for financing for the purchase, (R. 3455, 3566, 3703-04, 7547-48, 
7550-52, 9414-72.) The best offer they received was a $22.5 million 
secured senior note from Aetna, (id.; see R. 10911-69.) The terms of the 
Aetna financing required that Northstar exercise its option to 
become the general partner, and the employment contracts between 
the Mountain West Partners and MWT Ltd. be subordinated to the 
Aetna debt. (R. 7291-300, 7309-10, 7316-20, 9160, 10928.) 
MWT Ltd.'s purchase of Channel 20 for $30 million and the 
financing for that purchase through Aetna closed in October 1987 
(the "Adams Transaction") . (R. 7321-28, 10905-10, 10911-69.) The Channel 
20 acquisition permitted MWT Ltd. to put Channel 13 on the air in 
November 1987 with an established market and good independent 
programming, (R. 3454, 3456, 3564, 3567, 3705, 7540-41.) 
Northstar7s Conversion to General Partner 
Northstar, as required by the Aetna financing, exercised its 
option to become the sole general partner of MWT Ltd. in December 
1987. (R. 3457, 3569-70, 3705-06.) Upon FCC approval, Northstar became 
the sole general partner of MWT Ltd. in May 1988, and paid an 
additional $500,000 to MWT Ltd., as required by the MWT Ltd. 
Transaction, (id.) 
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25% Interest Notes/Farragut Management Fee 
Between 1987 and 1990, Salt Lake's economy generally, and the 
television market in particular, experienced a downturn, (see R. 
10189.) Channel 13 did not generate sufficient cash flow to meet 
MWT Ltd.'s obligations to Aetna and Adams, (R. 3404, 3457, 3570.) 
Northstar made extensive efforts to find additional financing for 
Channel 13, but was unable to find any source other than Allstate 
due to the requirement that any new MWT Ltd. debt be subordinated 
to its obligations to Aetna and Adams, (R. 3570.) Northstar was not 
only unable to find any outside source of financing, but 
Plaintiffs, including the Foulger Group, refused to infuse any 
funds into MWT Ltd. or relinquish any of their ownership in MWT 
Ltd. as a means to attract further financing, (R. 3405, 3457, 3570.) 
Allstate, concerned about Channel 13's deteriorating financial 
circumstances and Plaintiffs7 intransigence in assisting in a 
resolution of Channel 13's financial problems, demanded as a 
condition to any further financing that MWT Ltd. pay a management 
fee to Farragut, the holding company for Northstar, and also pay 
25% interest on any further loans, (R. 3404-05, 3458, 3570, 10981-82.) 
With no other source of funds to meet its obligations, MWT Ltd. 
agreed to Allstate's financing terms, (id^ ; R. 3395-96.) Allstate then 
extended further loans to MWT Ltd. to meet its Aetna and Adams' 
obligations, (R. 3405.) MWT Ltd., however, did not, in fact, pay the 
Farragut management fee or 25% interest to Allstate, (R. 3395-96; c. 
Foulger Dep. at 230; J. Lee Dep. at 500-02.) 
Employment Contracts 
In June 1987, Plaintiffs Joseph Lee, Sidney Foulger, Jo-Ann 
Kilpatrick and George Gonzales all entered into employment 
Contracts With MWT Ltd. (R. 3567-68, 9773-74.) 
In January 1989, when MWT Ltd. could not meet its obligations 
to Aetna and Adams, Northstar, as MWT Ltd.'s general partner, 
suspended payment under the Gonzales, Foulger and Kilpatrick 
employment contracts; in May 1989, Northstar suspended payment 
under Lee's employment contract, (R. 3568.) Northstar suspended 
payment under Plaintiffs' employment contracts because it was 
required to do so by the terms of the Aetna financing, terms agreed 
to by Plaintiffs. (icL.; R. 7291-7300, 10928.) By 1989, Aetna and Adams 
had declared defaults on MWT Ltd.' s financing obligations, and were 
threatening to accelerate MWT Ltd.'s $30 million debt. (R. 3396, 
10168-69; see R. 10230; J. Lee Dep. at 507.) 
Sale of Channel 13 to Fox 
Faced with MWT Ltd. 's mounting financial crisis, Northstar put 
Channel 13 on the market in January 1989. (R. 3459, 3571.) Northstar 
gave Plaintiffs almost a year to bid on Channel 13 for themselves 
or to find their own buyer, (R. 3396, 3459-60, 3571.) Plaintiffs did 
neither, (id.; see R. 10182-91.) MWT Ltd. was unable to meet its 
obligations to Adams and Aetna. They demanded payment, (id.) 
Allstate refused to lend MWT Ltd. any more money, and Plaintiffs 
continued to refuse to put any funds into MWT Ltd. or dilute their 
interest in MWT Ltd. to attract new financing from a third party. 
(Id.) 
Northstar, faced with the option of either selling Channel 13 
or placing it in bankruptcy, accepted a $41 million offer from Fox, 
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and closed the sale to Fox in April 1990. (R. 3396, 3459-60.) The $41 
million price was incontrovertibly a fair price for Channel 13. (R. 
3 3 9 6 , 7 5 6 6 - 6 7 ; D e f s . ' Add. Ex. 11 ( V o l . I I ) a t 4 1 ; Dep . Ex. D - 2 2 0 . ) A f t e r t h e 
$41 million payment, Northstar and Allstate still lost 
approximately $2.5 million in the Channel 13 venture, (R. 3460.) 
Cash Calls 
After the sale to Fox closed, Northstar dissolved MWT Ltd. (R. 
7259-62.) On December 30, 1991, Northstar sent Plaintiffs cash calls 
to make up the deficiencies in their capital accounts as required 
by the Partnership Agreement, (id.) Plaintiffs did not pay the 
calls, and Northstar has taken no action to collect them. (R. 7184, 
7190-98.) 
4. Plaintiffs7 Legal Representation In FCC Proceeding And Seven 
Business Transactions With Northstar and Allstate, 
Wiley Rein represented Mountain West in its quest for the 
Channel 13 license from April 1981 to December 19, 1986, when the 
FCC awarded the license to MWT Ltd. pursuant to the settlement 
agreements and MWT Ltd. Transaction, (R. 3410, 3420-22, 3424-25.) During 
that period, Wiley Rein represented Plaintiffs before the FCC, 
represented them in settlement negotiations, and assisted 
Plaintiffs in their search for financing, (id^ ; R. 5448, 10637-42, 10674-
80.) From December 19, 1986, until September 1987, Wiley Rein 
continued to provide legal services to MWT Ltd. before the FCC. 
The Wiley Rein lawyer who represented Mountain West and MWT Ltd. 
was Barry Wood. (R. 3390, 34io, 3420-25.) 
In the fall of 1987, Wiley Rein's representation of Plaintiffs 
ended, (R. 3410, 3425.) In September 1987, Barry Wood left the firm 
and joined David Lee in Jones Waldo's Washington, D.C. office, (id.) 
When Wood left, he took Plaintiffs' files and purchased their 
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accounts receivable from Wiley Rein with Plaintiffs' consent, (id.; 
R. 7199-7203.) From that point forward, Wiley Rein only represented 
Northstar, and only represented MWT Ltd. after Northstar became MWT 
Ltd.'s general partner in May 1988. (R. 3410.) Wiley Rein's total 
legal fees to Plaintiffs and MWT Ltd. for all services throughout 
the FCC proceedings up to the time Wood left were approximately 
$140,000. (See R. 3649, 7282-83.) 
After Wiley Rein requested Plaintiffs7 consent to its 
representation of Northstar in the summer of 1986, Plaintiffs in 
all their dealings with Northstar were represented by Dow Lohnes 
and Ralph Hardy. Northstar, in turn, in its dealings with 
Plaintiffs, was represented by Wiley Rein. Plaintiffs concede in 
their brief Dow Lohnes did its job and was not negligent. (Pis.' Br. 
at 45.) 
There was no genuine issue of fact that Dow Lohnes and Ralph 
Hardy from July 15, 1986, when they commenced their representation 
of Plaintiffs, until this action was filed, represented Plaintiffs 
as their lawyer and did so because Wiley Rein represented 
N o r t h s t a r . (R. 3 4 1 2 - 1 3 , 3 4 2 3 - 2 5 , 3 4 5 1 , 3 4 5 4 , 3 4 5 7 - 6 0 , 3 5 5 9 , 3 5 6 5 - 6 6 , 3 5 6 8 - 7 0 , 
3 6 9 6 - 9 7 , 3 7 0 2 - 0 4 , 7 2 8 2 - 8 3 , 7 4 6 0 - 8 2 9 4 , 8 3 3 9 , 8 8 8 0 , 9 4 9 2 - 9 5 , 9 6 2 4 - 9 7 7 7 , 9 8 2 7 - 9 9 5 4 , 
1 0 0 5 4 - 2 4 8 , 1 0 4 5 8 , 1 0 6 9 4 - 9 5 , 1 0 7 0 4 , 1 0 7 0 6 , 1 0 7 4 5 - 4 7 , 1 0 7 5 7 , 1 0 7 6 0 - 6 1 , 1 0 7 7 4 , 1 0 7 7 6 , 
1 0 7 8 0 - 8 1 , 1 0 7 8 5 , 1 0 7 8 7 - 8 9 , 1 0 7 9 2 , 1 0 7 9 4 - 9 5 , 1 0 7 9 9 - 8 0 0 , 1 0 8 0 8 - 0 9 , 1 0 8 6 2 - 6 3 , 1 0 8 8 3 , 
1 0 9 0 3 - 0 4 , 1 0 9 8 1 - 8 2 ; D e f s . ' Add. Ex. 11 ( V o l . I ) a t 1 4 3 - 4 7 , 1 6 6 , 1 9 5 , 2 2 1 - 2 8 ; idL. 
( V o l . I I ) a t 7 - 8 , 1 9 , 4 1 , 4 5 - 4 6 . ) 
Ralph Hardy unequivocally testified he represented Plaintiffs 
as a lawyer and was retained by Plaintiffs in the summer of 1986 
because "a client of Wiley, Rein was a party that they were talking 
to about providing financial support and that, because of that, it 
would be necessary for their group to have an independent or a 
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different—you know, a lawyer to represent them . . ." (R. 7476 
(emphasis supplied).) Dow Lohnes and Ralph Hardy are only engaged in 
the profession of law. Ralph Hardy explicitly testified that the 
only business, occupation and profession in which he and Dow Lohnes 
are engaged is the practice of law — "All of my involvement with 
Channel 13 was as a lawyer." (R. 7469-70, see 7464, 7466.) Dow Lohnes7 
billing records confirm that Dow Lohnes represented Plaintiffs as 
their lawyer. From 1986 to 1990, Dow Lohnes billed and Plaintiffs 
paid over $300,000 in attorneys7 fees. (R. 8278-92, 9414-95, 10237-48.) 
Finally, Dow Lohnes performed the services and functions of 
Plaintiffs7 lawyer. It negotiated under Plaintiffs7 lead, it 
drafted documents, it wrote letters explicitly stating that it was 
representing Plaintiffs, and it directed legal action on their 
b e h a l f . (R. 7460-8294 , 8339-9495, 9624-9777, 9827-9954, 10054-248, 10862-63 , 
10903-904 , 10981-82 . ) 
Ralph Hardy and Dow Lohnes performed extensive legal services 
in connection with the MWT Ltd. Transaction and Mountain West7s 
search for financing. In July 1986, Ralph Hardy traveled to Dallas 
to meet with the principals of CPL, and traveled to Chicago to meet 
with Allstate; in October 1986, he met with lawyers for the Skaggs 
family to negotiate financing to acquire the Channel 13 license. 
Dow Lohnes performed detailed economic analysis of Northstar7s and 
CPL7s written proposals. It gave Plaintiffs advice with regard to 
settling with competing applicants and reviewed the settlement 
agreements before they were signed. Dow Lohnes negotiated with 
Lincoln, Glakas, and Renze over operation and control issues, and 
the business terms of the Credit and Partnership agreements, 
including the amount and timing of funding, the respective 
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ownership interests of the parties in MWT Ltd., and Northstar's 
right and timing of conversion. Dow Lohnes lawyers, including 
Hardy, David Wild and Tim Kelley, attended the November face-to-
face negotiations, and assisted in drafting the Credit Agreement 
and Partnership Agreement, (R. 3412, 3450-51, 3557-59, 3696-97, 7278-79, 
7514-21, 7526-30, 7537-39, 7573-8269, 8278-87, 10582-83.) 
When the MWT Ltd. Transaction concluded and Dow Lohnes' legal 
work was completed, Plaintiffs paid Dow Lohnes over $75,000 for 
those services, (R. 8278-94.) The transmittal letter enclosed with 
the check stated: "Enclosed is a check #1006 for legal services 
rendered through December 1986." (R. 8293-94 (emphasis supplied).) This 
letter was signed by Plaintiff Jo-Ann Kilpatrick.6 (id.) 
Ralph Hardy and Dow Lohnes also performed extensive legal 
services in connection with the Adams Transaction for MWT Corp. and 
MWT. Ltd. and charged over $175,000 for those services, (R. 9414-92.) 
Dow Lohnes drafted the offer to Adams, negotiated with Adams7 
attorney for the purchase of Channel 20, and drafted the purchase 
agreements. Dow Lohnes negotiated and drafted the agreements 
providing for Aetna's financing, including the subordination 
agreement, (R. 3412, 3425, 3454-55, 3565-66f 3702-03, 7545-54, 8339-9495.) Dow 
Lohnes was listed as MWT Corp.'s lawyer in the purchase agreements. 
(R. 8880.) 
Plaintiffs were represented not just by Ralph Hardy and Dow 
Lohnes in the MWT Ltd. Transaction and the Adams Transaction, they 
were also represented by Ralph Hardy's brother, David Hardy, a 
lawyer in Salt Lake. (R. 8295-319, 9496-623.) In fact, David Hardy 
6. Furthermore, Plaintiffs gave a financial statement to Northstar and 
Allstate before the MWT Ltd. Transaction closed representing Mountain West owed 
Dow Lohnes over $30,000 for attorneys' fees. (R. 3621, 8134.) 
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incorporated MWT Corp. for Plaintiffs, and reviewed the draft and 
final Credit Agreement and Partnership Agreement with Plaintiffs 
before Plaintiffs signed the agreements in David Hardy's law office 
in Salt Lake, (see id.) David Hardy billed and Plaintiffs paid for 
his services, (R. 8319-21.) 
Indeed, Plaintiffs did not dispute that, after the Adams 
Transaction, Dow Lohnes and Ralph Hardy represented Plaintiffs in 
every transaction between Plaintiffs and Northstar. (R. 3331-34, 4002, 
9624-9777, 9827-9954, 10054-248.) Some Plaintiffs denied, however, that 
Dow Lohnes and Ralph Hardy represented them as their lawyer in the 
MWT Ltd. Transaction, claiming Hardy acted only as a financial 
advisor to the Foulgers.7 (R. 4002, 5077.) That testimony is 
absolutely incredible in the face of the record the Defendant 
lawyers presented. In fact, Plaintiff Clayton Foulger—a lawyer, 
Sidney Foulgers son and Brent Pratt's brother-in-law—testified 
that Ralph Hardy and Dow Lohnes represented them as lawyers in the 
MWT Ltd. Transaction and helped draft the Credit and Partnership 
agreements.8 (R. 7278-79.) 
7. Plaintiffs' claim that Dow Lohnes only represented MWT Ltd. in the Adams 
Transaction is sheer nonsense and contrary to the record. Plaintiff MWT Corp. 
was the general partner of MWT Ltd. at the time of the Adams Transaction and Dow 
Lohnes represented MWT Corp. Ralph Hardy testified, and the Dow Lohnes billing 
records reflect, Dow Lohnes represented Plaintiffs in the Adams Transaction. (R. 
7545-48, 8339-9495.) 
8. Mr. Foulger testified at his deposition: 
Q. Mr. Hardy was present at all these meetings, wasn't he? 
A. Yes, he was. 
Q. Actively representing the interests of Mr. Foulger and the Foulger 
group; isn't that true? 
A. Mr. Foulger. At that time we weren't involved, as you know. 
Q. But actively representing Mr. Foulger's interests? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As a lawyer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did Mr. Hardy participate in the drafting and negotiation of each 
one of these documents that relate to the MWT, Ltd. transaction set 
forth in Exhibit 2? 
A. He did. (R. 7278.) 
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There was no genuine issue of fact that in every transaction 
between Plaintiffs and Northstar, Dow Lohnes represented 
Plaintiffs, and Wiley Rein represented Northstar. There is not one 
exhibit, one document, one piece of paper that contradicts or 
controverts the inescapable conclusion that Dow Lohnes and its 
senior partner, Ralph Hardy, provided independent, competent and 
vigorous representation in all Plaintiffs' business dealings with 
Northstar. The one thing Dow Lohnes did not do is object or 
protest that any of the Defendant lawyers had a conflict of 
interest in representing Northstar. (R. 3412, 7521-23, 7555-56; Defs. Add. 
Ex. 11 (Vol. II) at 7-8.) 
5. Northstar And Allstate's Management Made The Decisions And 
Directed The Events In The Business Transactions Of Which 
Plaintiffs Complain And For Which They Seek Damages* 
Northstar and Allstate's managers categorically testified that 
they, and they alone, made the decisions in all seven transactions 
between Northstar, Allstate and Plaintiffs, with the exception of 
the sale to Fox and the cash calls. Lincoln, Renze, Glakas, and 
Richard Doppelt ("Doppelt"), categorically testified that every 
single element in those business transactions was the product and 
result of the decisions and directives that they made, and not the 
product or result of anything the Defendant lawyers did. (R. 3404-06, 
3450-60, 3556-71, 3696-706; see R. 3392-96, 3413-16.) Their testimony Was 
uncontroverted. 
With regard to the MWT Ltd. Transaction, Lincoln and Renze 
categorically testified they, and they alone, determined the amount 
and timing of Northstar's funding, the respective ownership 
interests in MWT Ltd. and Northstar7s conversion rights reflected 
in the Credit Agreement and Partnership Agreement. Wiley Rein 
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simply drafted the documents that Northstar, its client, directed 
i t t o d r a f t . (R. 3451-53 , 3559-64 , 3697-3701; see R. 3392-93 , 3 4 1 3 - 1 4 . ) 
With regard to the Adams Transaction, the purchase of Channel 
20 for $3 0 million and the financing of that purchase through Aetna 
were Plaintiffs7 deal, and Plaintiffs with their own lawyer, Ralph 
Hardy, negotiated, drafted and finalized the deal. MWT Ltd. Corp. 
was MWT Ltd.'s general partner and controlled MWT. Ltd. While 
Lincoln and Renze supported those decisions, they did not make 
them. Wiley Rein was not even at the meeting in Salt Lake when 
Plaintiffs, Northstar and Allstate with Plaintiffs7 lawyer, Ralph 
Hardy, made the decision to purchase Channel 20. (R. 3454-56, 3565, 
7543, 10905-10; see R. 3393-94, 3414-15.) 
With regard to Northstar7s conversion to general partner, 
Lincoln and Renze decided, pursuant to the terms of the MWT Ltd. 
Transaction that Northstar would elect to become the general 
partner of MWT Ltd. in December 1987, and would become the general 
p a r t n e r i n May 1 9 8 8 . (R. 3394-95 , 3415, 3457, 3569-70, 3705-06 . ) 
With regard to the 25% interest/management fee, Allstate, 
based on Doppelt's recommendations, made the decision to require 
MWT Ltd. to pay 25% interest and sign a management contract with 
Farragut as a condition to lending MWT Ltd. money, (R. 3404-05, 3416, 
3458, 3570-71.) Northstar had no alternative but to sign the notes to 
keep MWT Ltd. afloat, (R. 3395-96.) 
With regard to the suspension of payments, Lincoln and Doppelt 
made the decision to suspend payments under the Mountain West 
Partners7 employment contracts because the Aetna subordination 
agreement Plaintiffs signed required suspension, (R. 3394, 3415, 3568-
69.) 
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Lincoln made the decision to put Channel 13 up for sale. (R. 
3571.) The Northstar Board made the business decisions to sell 
Channel 13 to Fox and issue the cash calls, (R. 3396, 3405, 3416, 3459-
60, 3571.) 
6. Richard Wiley, As A Northstar Director And Farracmt 
Shareholder, Did Not Make The Decisions Or Direct The Events 
In The Seven Business Transactions Of Which Plaintiffs 
Complain And Seek Damages, 
Richard Wiley was a director of Northstar from July 7, 1986, 
until January 31, 1992; from November 1987 until the sale to Fox, 
he was a director and small shareholder of Farragut.9 (R. 3390, 3553-
54.) The elements in the seven business transactions of which 
Plaintiffs complain were not the product or result of Mr. Wiley's 
role as a director of either corporation, and certainly were not 
the product of his role as a shareholder of Farragut. The 
uncontroverted fact was all those transactions would have occurred 
and did occur as the result of Northstar and Allstate's management, 
regardless of Wiley's vote, except the sale of Channel 13 to Fox 
and the cash calls, (R. 3404-06, 3450-60, 3556-71, 3696-706.) In every 
instance when Wiley voted, there was always an independent majority 
of the Board who voted to approve management's decisions and the 
transactions, except the sale to Fox and the cash calls, (R. 3393-96, 
3456-57, 3459, 3564, 3567, 3569-71.) The decision to sell Channel 13 to 
Fox and the cash calls were business decisions made by Northstar's 
Board at a time when Wiley Rein was not representing any Plaintiff. 
(R. 3396, 3406, 3410, 3425, 3459-60.) 
9. In November 1987, Wiley purchased 10% of Farragut's common stock, (R. 
3553-54.) Wiley received no proceeds from the sale of Channel 13 to Fox. (R. 
3396.) 
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In the MWT Ltd. Transaction, Northstar's Board did not vote to 
ratify the transaction or the Partnership or Credit agreements 
reflecting that transaction until after the business terms had been 
decided and agreed to by the Mountain West Partners, Lincoln and 
Renze.10 (R. 3393-94, 3567.) In the Adams Transaction, Northstar's 
Board did not vote on the transaction, (R. 3394, 3567.) With regard 
to conversion and the employment contracts, the Northstar Board 
only voted to ratify the actions previously taken by Northstar's 
management. (R. 3394-95, 3568-70.) With regard to the 25% 
interest/management fee, the Northstar Board authorized Lincoln to 
sign the 25% interest notes because there was no other financing 
available to pay the Aetna and Adam's obligations then due. (R. 3395-
96.) With regard to the sale of Channel 13, the Northstar Board 
voted to ratify Lincoln's decision to put Channel 13 on the market. 
(R. 3571.) 
Wiley voted to sale Channel 13 to Fox, and his vote was 
necessary to authorize the transaction by Northstar. (R. 3396.) 
Wiley voted for the transaction because he believed that the only 
alternative was to sell Channel 13 to Fox or place it in 
bankruptcy. Prior to the sell, Wiley did everything he could to 
keep Channel 13 from being sold; he repeatedly requested that 
Allstate provide further financing, but Allstate refused, (R. 3396; 
see R. 10185.) Wiley asked Plaintiffs and their lawyer, Ralph Hardy, 
to help with a financing plan to pay Adams and Aetna, but 
Plaintiffs refused. (R. 3459-60.) Wiley thought there was no 
10. At this time, there were six members of the Northstar Board; at the 
time of Northstar's conversion to general partner, the suspension of payments 
under the employment contracts, Allstate's demand for 25% interest notes and the 
decision to put Channel 13 on the market, there were four members of the Board; 
by the time Channel 13 was sold to Fox, only Wiley and Glakas remained on the 
Board. (R. 3393-96) 
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alternative and authorized the sale. (R. 3396, ioi85-87.) At the time 
of his vote, Wiley Rein was not representing any Plaintiff, (R. 
3410.) 
After Channel 13 was sold, Wiley and Glakas, the only 
remaining Northstar Directors, voted for Northstar to dissolve MWT 
Ltd. because the sale had disposed of substantially all MWT Ltd.'s 
assets, (R. 7259-62.) Then, as required by the Partnership Agreement, 
Northstar issued cash calls to all the MWT Ltd. partners, including 
Northstar, because there were deficits in the partners7 capital 
accounts. (IdL.; see R. 3659-60.) 
7. There Was No Showing Of A Reasonable Likelihood Plaintiffs 
Would Have Acquired The Necessary Financing For Channel 13 
From CPL Or Any Other Source. 
Plaintiffs in their brief repeatedly assert that, in the 
summer of 1986, they obtained $10 million commitments in financing 
for the Channel 13 venture from both Northstar and CPL. (pis.' Br. at 
9, 23, 38.) Plaintiffs7 assertions are made out of whole cloth. If 
Plaintiffs received $10 million commitments from Northstar and CPL, 
where are they? They certainly are not in Plaintiffs' record. 
The fact is, after one year of actively seeking financing, the 
only commitment Plaintiffs received was from Northstar for $6 
million of direct financing in late November 1986. (see R. 3453, 3556-
61, 3573-693, 3696-99; J. Lee Dep. at 189-93; Defs.' Add. Ex. 16.) Plaintiffs 
never received a commitment from Northstar until the Credit and 
Partnership agreements were signed in late November 1986. (See id.) 
Plaintiffs never had a commitment from CPL or any other party, (R. 
5447-48, 7080, 7284-86, 7472-78, 7481-87, 7806, 8125-33, 8198-99, 8278-91; Defs.' 
Add. Ex. 16.) 
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Plaintiffs did receive a proposal, not a commitment, from CPL 
that was not definite or specific as to its terms, (see R. 7080.) 
More importantly, CPL was only willing to put-up $2 million of CPL 
money to finance the Channel 13 venture, (seeid,.) That amount would 
not have even financed the settlement agreements, (R. 3434-41, 3649, 
7208-30; Defs.' Add. Exs. 13-14.) 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs testified they rejected the CPL 
proposal because they did not trust one of the CPL principals, and 
because CPL wanted a 70% interest.11 (R. 7277, 7284-85.) Mountain West 
did not attempt to reinstate the CPL proposal when Northstar 
allegedly changed the deal in November 1986. Mountain West did not 
attempt to contact CPL when there was an issue as to whether they 
wanted to purchase Channel 20. (R. 5153-54.) 
8. There Was No Showing The Defendant Lawyers Used Or Misused 
Confidential Information Of Plaintiffs, 
The Defendant lawyers put in a clear record that they never 
used or misused any confidential information concerning Plaintiffs 
in their representation of Northstar. (R. 3390-92, 3413, 3415, 3424, 3453, 
3560-61, 3698-99.) All information Lincoln, Glakas and Renze had 
regarding Plaintiffs was disclosed by Plaintiffs in the FCC 
proceedings to obtain the license and by Plaintiffs and their 
counsel, Dow Lohnes, directly to Lincoln, Glakas and Renze in the 
course of Plaintiffs' attempt to persuade those business entities 
t o become t h e i r f i nanc ing p a r t n e r . 1 2 (R. 3421, 3698-99, 7524-32, 10606, 
11. There is also evidence Plaintiffs rejected the CPL proposal because CPL 
would not agree to let Joseph Lee manage the station. (Defs.' Add. Ex. 17.) 
12. The information Wood had with regard to Mountain West's settlement with 
West Valley was a matter of public record before the FCC, and the terms and 
conditions of the settlements with Family and West Valley had been disclosed to 
Lincoln, Glakas and Renze by the Mountain West Partners and their lawyer, Hardy, 
in the course of the November face-to-face negotiations. (R. 3421, 3424, 3698-
32 
10627, 10636, 10700-01, 10453-54, 10591-92, 10550-51.) Lincoln and Hardy 
testified that, as a matter of common business practice, Northstar 
and Allstate would not have entered into an agreement with Mountain 
West to provide $6 million in financing for Channel 13 without 
knowing Plaintiffs' financial position, Plaintiffs7 business plans, 
and the terms and conditions of the settlement agreements Northstar 
and Allstate had been asked to finance, (R. 3561, 7531-32.) That record 
was uncontroverted. 
Moreover, neither Wiley nor any Wiley Rein lawyer representing 
Northstar in the seven business transactions had any confidential 
information concerning Plaintiffs, (R. 3391-92, 3413, 3424.) The FCC 
pleadings, the general correspondence from Wood, and the letters 
concerning Plaintiffs7 legal bills which Wood routed on occasion to 
Quale and Wiley contained no confidential or privileged 
information, (see pis.' Br. at 3 n.2.) Wood did not represent Northstar 
in the MWT Ltd. Transaction, and testified he knew of no 
confidential information regarding Plaintiffs in his possession at 
the time of that transaction, (R. 3424.) 
Wiley Rein did not represent Adams in the Adams Transaction, 
and it was uncontroverted Wiley Rein did not disclose any 
information concerning Plaintiffs to Adams, (R. 3515.) 
9. Plaintiffs7 Attempts To Put-up Other Straw Men Are Immaterial 
To The Issue Of Proximate Cause, 
Several straw men postulated by Plaintiffs in their brief are 
untrue and immaterial to proximate cause. For example: 
99, 7524-32, 10453-54, 10550-51, 10591-92, 10606, 10627, 10636, 10700-01.) The 
Foulger-Pratt financial statement was on file with the FCC, and Sidney Foulger 
provided his financial statement to Northstar and Allstate's management during 
the negotiations to assure them he had the financial wherewithal to meet a $2.7 
million obligation. (R. 3561, 7748.) The other Mountain West Partners were not 
going to put-up any money. 
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1. Plaintiffs' assertion Wiley Rein represented Adams with 
regard to the possible purchase of Channel 13 and the sale of 
Channel 20, and that John Quale represented Adams in those matters 
is a deliberate attempt by Plaintiffs to mislead the Court. (see 
pis.' Br. at 4.) In early 1986, Wiley opened a file for Adams 
concerning whether a third party who was not an applicant for 
Channel 13 could purchase the Channel 13 license from the 
successful applicant, (R. 5552-53, 5620-22.) Wiley Rein spent less 
than 3 hours on the matter, and no further work was done after 
February 1986, consistent with Wiley Rein's representation of 
Plaintiffs, (see R. 5620-21.) Russ Eagan, not John Quale, was the 
lawyer responsible for the Adams representation, (R. 5553; see R. 6348.) 
Quale only spent a total of .50 hours in early 1986 on Adams' 
matters. (See R. 5620-21.) 
2. Plaintiffs' assertion Allstate was a client of Wiley Rein 
in the summer of 1986, and their implication Wiley Rein represented 
Allstate in the transactions at issue are false, (see Pis.' Br. at 6.) 
Wiley Rein never represented Allstate in any of the transactions at 
issue, and only represented Allstate on a few insurance claims 
beginning in 1988. (R. 3391, 3406, 3412, 3706, 56io, 5633, 5764-67, 7350-52.) 
3. Plaintiffs made a number of false and misleading 
assertions regarding Wood. For example: 
a. Wiley Rein red-lining dispute. Plaintiffs make much 
ado about a dispute between Wiley Rein and Wood regarding Wiley 
Rein's representation of Northstar in the MWT Ltd. Transaction, 
(see pis.' Br. at 15-16.) The dispute, however, had nothing to do with 
any conflict of interest. It related to an accusation that Wiley 
Rein had altered the Credit Agreement after the negotiations, but 
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before it was signed, (R. 6452-56.) The accusation was untrue, as 
conclusively demonstrated by a red-lined version of the Credit 
Agreement Wiley Rein sent to Plaintiffs' lawyer in Salt Lake—David 
Hardy, who is Ralph Hardy's brother. (Dep. EX. D-69.) John Quale was 
upset with Wood because he had initially sided with Plaintiffs with 
regard to the accusation, (R. 6452-55, 10868-70.) There was no basis for 
the accusation, and Quale did not believe a Wiley Rein lawyer 
should be accusing his partners of improper conduct without the 
facts. (id.) An investigation shortly after the MWT Ltd. 
Transaction resulted in Wood's censorship, but had nothing to do 
with a conflict of interest, (R. 10885-98.) Statements made in the 
investigation are not adverse to the Defendant lawyers but, in 
fact, confirm they obtained Plaintiffs' consent to Wiley Rein's 
representation of Northstar, and that Plaintiffs agreed to and did 
retain their own lawyer—Dow Lohnes. (R. 10864, 10876, 10883, 10886.) 
b. Wood's representation. Plaintiffs' implication Wood 
represented Plaintiffs and Northstar in negotiations in the MWT 
Ltd. Transaction is categorically false and certainly is not 
supported by the record cited. (see Pis.' Br. at 13.) Wood did not 
represent Northstar in the MWT Ltd. Transaction negotiations, and 
Wood so testified, (R. 3422-24; see R. 3557.) Wood did not represent 
Plaintiffs in the negotiations, and Wood so testified, (R. 3422-24.) 
The only services Wood performed with regard to the MWT Ltd. 
Transaction were: (1) giving the parties historical information as 
to the status of the FCC proceeding; (2) performing work toward 
regulatory approval of the MWT Ltd. Transaction after it closed; 
and (3) working toward settling with competing applicants, (R. 3410-
12, 3430-33, 3422-24.) 
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c. Wiley Rein's representation of Northstar, Plaintiffs' 
assertions Wood told Wiley Rein it could not ethically represent 
Northstar, and objected to Wiley Rein's representation of Northstar 
are false and contrary to the record they cite. (see pis.' Br. at 5, 
14, 16.) Wood testified he never objected to Wiley Rein representing 
Northstar, and never told Wiley Rein its representation of 
Northstar was unethical, (R. 7361-63, 10643-50, 10690-91.) Plaintiffs' 
sole support for its assertion is a memorandum purportedly 
containing Wood's "beliefs" which the Defendant lawyers moved to 
strike because it was written in connection with attempts to settle 
this matter while Wood was practicing law with David Lee, was 
inadmissible hearsay and contrary to the record, (R. 7130-33, 7373-94.) 
d. Plaintiffs' settlement agreements. Plaintiffs' 
assertion that "Wood knew they were in a terrible position because 
they had to pay $2 million . . . and had no financing alternative 
available at the time . . ."is false and misleading. (See pia.' Br. 
at 14 n.5.) The record shows that Wood testified it was Plaintiffs' 
fault, not Wiley Rein's fault, that they found themselves in the 
position of having to make a $2 million escrow payment to Family 
without the financing commitment they wanted from Northstar and 
Allstate. (R. 5477.) He testified Mountain West had made the 
decision, on it own, to sign the settlement agreements without a 
firm financing commitment, contrary to Wood's warning not to do so. 
(id.) As a consequence, Mountain West was in the position that it 
either had to find alternative financing or accept Northstar and 
Allstate's offer. 
e. Date of Wiley Rein meeting. Plaintiffs' assertion 
"on June 11, 1986," Mr. Wiley, Mr. Quale and Mr. Wood met to 
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discuss the firm's representation of Northstar is false and not 
supported by the record cited. (see pis.' Br. at 5.) There is 
absolutely no evidence Wiley, Quale and Wood met on that date to 
discuss Wiley Rein's representation of Northstar. (see R. 7364.) 
IX. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Unquestionably, proximate cause is an essential element of 
Plaintiffs' legal malpractice claim. Proximate cause requires not 
only "but for" causation, it requires "substantial" causation. The 
fault shown must be the "substantial" cause of the damages claimed. 
That is the fundamental rule of proximate cause in Utah in all tort 
actions, including actions for breach of fiduciary duty. 
The Utah Supreme Court, moreover, has squarely held that to 
prove proximate cause in a legal malpractice action, the plaintiff 
must show that, in the absence of a defendant lawyer's breach of 
duty, there is a reasonable likelihood the plaintiff would have 
achieved the better business or legal result for which the 
plaintiff claims damages. The "reasonable likelihood" rule 
requires that a plaintiff's damage claim be grounded in reality and 
not speculation and fantasy about what might have been. 
The uncontroverted facts show there was no genuine issue of 
material fact on the essential element of proximate cause. First, 
every element in the seven business transactions of which 
Plaintiffs complained and sought damages were the exclusive product 
and result of the decisions and directives of Northstar and 
Allstate, non-party business entities, and not the result of any 
breach of duty by the Defendant lawyers. Second, it was 
incontrovertible that Plaintiffs had their own independent counsel, 
Dow Lohnes, every step of the way in every business transaction 
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between Plaintiffs and Northstar and Allstate. Third, Plaintiffs 
failed to show any reasonable likelihood that, in the absence of 
the Defendant lawyers' alleged breach of duty, conflict of interest 
they would have obtained the better business result, including the 
license for Channel 13, for which they claimed damages. 
The lower court correctly applied Utah's rules of proximate 
cause in awarding the Defendant lawyers summary judgment. That is 
why Plaintiffs, for the first time, now contend there is a 
different rule, a new rule of proximate cause, for claims based on 
breach of fiduciary duty as opposed to claims based on negligence. 
Plaintiffs are wrong; the rules are the same. Plaintiffs simply 
propose a new rule because their legal malpractice claim is barred 
by the rules of proximate cause. 
Plaintiffs propose a "chain of events" or a "different course 
of action" rule of proximate cause in breach of fiduciary duty 
cases. Essentially, Plaintiffs propose a "things would have been 
different" rule. Plaintiffs' new rule is contrary to Utah law and 
the Restatement, and would base the requisite causal connection 
between fault and damage on speculation and remoteness. 
Plaintiffs' new rule would make lawyers the guarantors of their 
client's legal and business expectations regardless of the 
likelihood those expectations would have been realized in the 
absence of the lawyer's fault. 
Finally, Plaintiffs have not pointed to one piece of 
confidential information the Defendant lawyers used or misused in 
their representation of Northstar or, for that matter, one single 
piece of confidential information the Defendant lawyers even had at 
the time of any of the seven business transactions. It was 
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uncontroverted that all information Northstar and Allstate had 
concerning Plaintiffs was information they obtained directly from 
Plaintiffs or which was part of the public record Plaintiffs filed 
with the FCC. 
The Court, therefore, should affirm the lower court7s summary 
judgment because there was no genuine issue of material fact on the 
essential element of proximate cause. 
X. ARGUMENT 
A. IN UTAH, THE FUNDAMENTAL RULE IS THAT PROXIMATE CAUSE, AN 
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF A LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM, REQUIRES NOT 
ONLY "BUT FOR" CAUSATION, BUT "SUBSTANTIAL" CAUSATION. 
Proximate cause is an essential element of a legal malpractice 
claim, and courts have not hesitated to grant summary judgment on 
the issue of proximate cause despite a prima facie showing of 
breach of duty. See, e.g., Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887 (Utah 
1988); Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894 
(Utah 1978); Yusefzadeh v. Ross, 932 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1991); 
Johnson v. Jones, 652 P.2d 650 (Idaho 1982); Stansberv v. 
Schroeder, 412 N.W.2d 447 (Neb. 1987); see also Holmes v. 
Securities Investors Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 117 L. Ed 2d 
532, 543-45 & nns.10-12, 556 (1992); Fausett v. American Resources 
Management Corp., 542 F. Supp. 1234, 1240 (D. Utah 1982); Prosser 
& Keeton on Torts § 41 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter 
"Prosser111 ; Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 9, 431 & cmt. e, 874 
& cmt. b, 910 (1965). 
Proximate cause, at a minimum, requires "but for" causation. 
That is, a plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable 
jury could find "but for" a defendant's wrongful conduct, the 
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plaintiff would not have suffered cognizable injury. Prosser § 41; 
see Mitchell v. Pearson Enter. 697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985); 
Barber, 765 P.2d at 889; Dunn, 584 P.2d at 896; Yusefzadeh, 932 
F.2d at 1264; Johnson, 652 P.2d at 655; Stansberv. 412 N.W.2d at 
450. 
Proximate cause, however, not only requires "but for" 
causation, it also requires "substantial" causation. The fault 
shown must be the "substantial" cause of the damage claimed. That 
is the fundamental rule in Utah. Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 245-46; see 
Barber, 765 P.2d at 889; Dunn, 584 P.2d at 896-97; see also Prosser 
§ 41; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 & cmts. a & e (1965). 
"Substantial" causation is required to show proximate cause 
because, without it, there would be infinite liability for every 
wrongful act. Without it, every wrongful act could be said to be 
the cause of any event, no matter how remote. Prosser § 41; 
Holmes, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 543 n.10, 544-45, 556. 
B. APPLICATION OF THE UTAH RULE ON PROXIMATE CAUSE TO THE SEVEN 
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS DEMONSTRATES THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE 
OF FACT ON THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
If Plaintiffs were injured by any of the seven business 
transactions of which they complain and seek damages, it was not 
"but for" any legal malpractice of the Defendant lawyers. Not a 
single element, decision or event in any of the seven transactions 
about which Plaintiffs complain and seek damages would have changed 
or been different had Wiley Rein not engaged in the alleged breach 
of duty, conflict of interest. The result in each of the seven 
business transactions would have been the same if Wiley Rein had 
resigned and not represented Northstar. The results would have 
been the same if Wiley Rein had represented Plaintiffs. If 
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Plaintiffs wanted to sue someone regarding the seven business 
transactions, they should have sued their business partners— 
Allstate and Northstar. 
If Plaintiffs were injured by reason of any of the seven 
business transactions of which they complain and seek damages, it 
was "but for" the terms, decisions and actions dictated and 
directed by the business non-parties. The Defendant lawyers did 
not decide, dictate or direct the business transactions between 
Plaintiffs, Northstar and Allstate* Northstar, Allstate and 
Farragut—business non-parties—made every decision and dictated 
every term and action in all seven business transactions which 
Plaintiffs claim caused them damages. Lincoln, Glakas, Renze and 
Doppelt testified that Northstar and Allstate, not the Defendant 
lawyers, dictated and directed every term and action in the 
business transactions, including the amount and timing of funding, 
Northstar and Plaintiffs' ownership interests in MWT Ltd., and 
Northstar's right to convert to general partner in the MWT Ltd. 
Transaction. That testimony was uncontroverted. (R. 3404-06, 3450-60, 
3556-71 , 3696-706; s e e R. 3392-96 , 3413-16) 
P l a i n t i f f s have admitted t h a t Northstar and A l l s t a t e , not the 
Defendant lawyers, made the decis ions about which they complain.13 
For example, P l a i n t i f f s ' br ief s t a t e s : "Defendants7 June 1986 
13. P l a i n t i f f s ' br ie f i s r ep le te with admissions that Northstar and 
A l l s t a t e made the dec i s ions of which P l a i n t i f f s complain and for which they seek 
damages. For example, P l a i n t i f f s s t a t e : "When P l a i n t i f f s objected t o the 
purchase [of Channel 2 0 ] , Northstar's representat ives s tated that i f P l a i n t i f f s 
did not go along with the dec i s ion t o purchase Adams' Channel 20, Northstar and 
A l l s t a t e would not provide even the funding they had agreed t o at the squeeze 
down. Based on that ultimatum, the [Mountain West] Partners again concluded they 
had no a l t e r n a t i v e but t o accede once again to Northstar's d e c i s i o n . " [ P i s . ' Br. 
at 16 ( c i t a t i o n omi t t ed ) . ] P l a i n t i f f s further s t a t e : "Al l s tate decide t o s e l l 
[Channel 1 3 ] . . . . Northstar and Farragut . . . decided to s e l l the s t a t i o n to 
Fox." f Id. at 20-21 (emphasis supp l i ed ) . ] Sidney Foulger t e s t i f i e d i t was 
Northstar and A l l s t a t e that caused h i s damage. (R. 7271.) 
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breaches set in motion a chain of events in which Northstar/ 
Allstate . . . forced their decisions on Plaintiffs. Absent 
Defendants7 breaches of full disclosure and consent in June 1986, 
none of the events in that chain, including the decisions of 
Northstar /Allstate, could have occurred." (pis. Br. at 39-40 (emphasis 
supplied).) 
As a matter of law, Plaintiffs cannot hold the Defendant 
lawyers responsible for the business decisions of Allstate and 
their client, Northstar.14 See Purdy v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 
203 Cal. Rptr. 524, 534-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); accord Franko v. 
Mitchell, 762 P.2d 1345, 1355 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).15 Lawyers are 
not principals; they are simply agents of their clients, and cannot 
be held responsible for the business decisions of those clients. 
In fact, a lawyer has no right or duty to compel his client or a 
third party to make a particular business decision, or to prevent 
his client from implementing a business decision with which he 
disagrees. A client has the right to make its own business 
decisions and to implement those business decisions through its 
counsel. Purdy, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 535. 
Moreover, if Plaintiffs were injured as the result of these 
business transactions, it was "but for11 Plaintiffs' own voluntary 
14. This rule applies even when the lawyer represents both parties to the 
transaction. See Purdy., 203 Cal. Rptr. at 534-35. In this case, however, the 
Defendant lawyers did not engage in simultaneous adverse representation, contrary 
to Plaintiffs' assertion. 
15. The only two authorities Plaintiffs cite, In re D.H. Overmyer 
Telecasting Co., 77 B.R. 128 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) and Johnson v. Miller, 596 
F. Supp. 768 (D. Colo. 1989), are not to the contrary. Both these cases involve 
illicit conduct by a party. In Overmyer, the party was a client of the lawyer. 
In Johnson, the party was not a client. The issue in both cases, unlike here, 
was whether the lawyer should have foreseen the illicit conduct of another and 
avoided it. Here, non-party business entities made business decisions, and it 
was those business decisions that were the direct cause of Plaintiffs' claimed 
damages, not the Defendant lawyers. 
42 
decisions and actions, not "but for" the Defendant lawyers' alleged 
breach of duty, conflict of interest. See Dunn, 584 P.2d at 897. 
If Plaintiffs were unhappy with Northstar's offer and the business 
terms Northstar and Allstate demanded in the MWT Ltd. Transaction, 
they could have walked away; they could have financed the 
settlements themselves to obtain the Channel 13 license. (see R. 
7248; D e f s . ' Add. Ex. 15 . ) T h e y C h o s e n o t t o . 
The decision to purchase Channel 20 was under Plaintiffs' 
control; Plaintiff MWT Corp. was the general partner of MWT Ltd. at 
the time it purchased Channel 20, and the purchase would not have 
occurred without Plaintiffs' consent and participation. The 
Defendant lawyers were not even present at the meeting when 
Plaintiffs, Northstar, Allstate and Plaintiffs' lawyer, Ralph 
Hardy, made the decision to purchase Channel 20. If Plaintiffs had 
wanted to build Channel 13 instead of purchasing Channel 20, 
nothing stopped them from doing that. Sidney Foulger could have 
provided the financing he had agreed to provide in the MWT Ltd. 
Transaction, or Plaintiffs could have found someone to buy out 
N o r t h s t a r a n d A l l s t a t e . (R. 3454-67, 3565, 3701-05, 10905-10; s e e R. 3606-93; 
Defs.' Add. Ex. 15.) Again, they chose not to. 
Finally, if Plaintiffs had wanted to avoid the sale of Channel 
13 to Fox, they could have done so. Plaintiffs had over a year to 
find a buyer for Channel 13 or to purchase the station themselves. 
To prevent the sale, Plaintiffs could have agreed to equity 
financing for MWT Ltd.'s debts to Adams and Aetna, or could have 
agreed to Allstate7s financing terms instead of objecting and 
threatening to sue. Plaintiffs, however, did none of these things, 
and Channel 13 was sold to Fox for an admittedly good price rather 
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than being put in bankruptcy.16 (R. 3395-96, 3404-06, 3457-60, 3570-71, 
10182-91.) 
C. WILEY'S ROLE AS A DIRECTOR OF NORTHSTAR AND A DIRECTOR AND 
SHAREHOLDER OF FARRAGUT AFTER NOVEMBER 1987 WAS NOT A "BUT 
FOR" CAUSE OF PLAINTIFFS' DAMAGES AND WAS NOT A BREACH OF 
WILEY'S PROFESSIONAL DUTIES TO PLAINTIFFS, 
Each term, decision and action relating to the seven business 
transactions about which Plaintiffs complain and seek damages was 
made by the management for Northstar and Farragut, Lincoln and 
Glakas, except the sale of Channel 13 to Fox and the cash calls. 
Each management decision and transaction was approved by an 
independent majority of the Northstar Board, except the sale of 
Channel 13 to Fox and the cash calls, Richard Wiley, as a single 
board member, did not make those decisions, direct those actions, 
or impact the Board's decisions. If Wiley had resigned from the 
Northstar Board, had not been present, or had voted against the 
transactions, the results would have been the same.17 Wiley, 
moreover, owed no professional duty to Plaintiffs as a director of 
Northstar or Farragut with regard to any of the seven business 
transactions; he had no duty to do what Plaintiffs demanded in 
their own best interest. (R. 3393-96, 3404-06, 3413-16, 3450-60, 3556-71, 
3696-706, 3992-96.) 
16. No one coerced Plaintiffs or forced them under duress to enter into any 
of the seven business transactions, particularly the MWT Ltd. Transaction, Legal 
coercion and duress require a plaintiff to show that a defendant's conduct placed 
him in such fear that he was deprived of his free will. See Heglar Ranch Inc. 
v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390f 1391 (Utah 1980); Wiesen v. Shout, 604 P.2d 1191, 
1192 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979); Bohm v. Commerce Union Bank, 794 F. Supp. 158, 164 
(W.D. Pa. 1992); see also Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Ziegler, 680 F. Supp. 
235, 237-38 (E.D. La. 1988). There is no such showing here and, indeed, 
Plaintiffs have made no legal argument that they were claiming coercion or 
duress. 
17. In fact, that is exactly what happened in the Adams Transaction. Wiley 
was not even at the Board meeting when the other five directors voted to ratify 
Lincoln's consent. (Dep. Ex. P-25.) 
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In the MWT Ltd. Transaction, an independent majority of the 
Northstar Board voted to ratify the deal that had already been 
reached by Plaintiffs, Northstar7s management and Allstate, (see id.) 
In the Adams Transaction, the decision to buy Channel 20 and 
finance that purchase through Aetna, insofar as Northstar and 
Allstate were concerned, was a decision of management and 
Plaintiffs, who controlled MWT Ltd. and authorized the deal, (see 
id.) With regard to Northstar's conversion to general partner, an 
independent majority of the Northstar Board voted to ratify 
Lincoln's decision to convert Northstar to general partner, as 
required by the Aetna financing which Plaintiffs had signed, (see 
id.) With regard to the suspension of payments under the Mountain 
West Partners7 employment contracts, the Northstar Board took no 
action on Lee's contract, and an independent majority of the Board 
ratified Lincoln's suspension of the other Mountain West Partners' 
payments, as required by the Aetna financing, (see id.) With regard 
to the 25% interest notes demanded by Allstate, an independent 
majority of the Board authorized Lincoln to sign the notes with 
Allstate to keep Channel 13 afloat, (see id^ ) With regard to the sale 
of Channel 13, an independent majority of the Board voted to ratify 
Lincoln's decision to put Channel 13 on the market, (R. 3571.) 
It is true Wiley voted to sell Channel 13 to Fox. But Wiley 
and the only other Northstar director, Glakas, were faced with the 
Hobson's choice of either selling the station or putting it in 
bankruptcy. Allstate had refused to lend MWT Ltd. any more money 
despite Wiley's repeated requests, and Plaintiffs had refused to 
cooperate by obtaining financing or diluting their own interest to 
obtain financing. Plaintiffs had been given one year to purchase 
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the station themselves or find another buyer, but had done neither. 
Faced with the choice between selling Channel 13 at an admittedly 
good price or putting the station in bankruptcy, Wiley voted to 
sell the station to maximize the sale proceeds. (R. 3396, 3406, 3459-
60.) 
With regard to the cash calls, Wiley and Glakas simply voted 
for Northstar to fulfill MWT Ltd.'s obligation under the 
Partnership Agreement to issue cash calls to all the partners, 
including Northstar, because there were deficits in their capital 
accounts Upon MWT Ltd.'S dissolution. (See R. 3659-60, 7259-62.) 
Finally, Wiley Rein did not represent Plaintiffs with regard 
to any of these transactions and, with the exception of the MWT 
Ltd. Transaction, was not representing Plaintiffs on any matter 
when the Northstar Board voted to approve the transactions and 
management decisions. Wiley Rein was not representing any 
Plaintiff on any matter when Wiley became a director and 
shareholder of Farragut.18 (R. 3390, 3410, 3412-13, 3424-25.) 
D. UNDER UTAH LAW, A PLAINTIFF IN A LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION MUST 
DEMONSTRATE A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT, ABSENT THE LAWYER'S 
BREACH OF DUTY, THE PLAINTIFF WOULD HAVE ACHIEVED THE BETTER 
BUSINESS OR LEGAL RESULT FOR WHICH THE PLAINTIFF CLAIMS 
DAMAGES; "BUT FOR" CAUSATION ALONE IS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT. 
The Utah courts have squarely held that a plaintiff in a legal 
malpractice action must present evidence from which a reasonable 
jury could find that, in the absence of the breach of duty claimed, 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the better business or legal 
18. Incidently, Plaintiffs and their lawyer, Ralph Hardy, knew Wiley was 
a member of the Northstar Board well before Plaintiffs entered into the MWT Ltd. 
Transaction—"I [Ralph Hardy] think I knew that very early on"—and never 
complained of his role. (R. 7357-58; Defs.' Add. Ex. 11 (Vol. II) at 46.) In 
fact, the FCC reports which Plaintiffs signed and filed clearly stated Wiley was 
a director of Northstar and was a director and shareholder of Farragut. (R. 
7338-39, 7357-58.) 
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result for which the plaintiff claims damages would have been 
achieved. Barber, 765 P.2d at 889; see Dunn, 584 P.2d at 896. 
In Barber, the defendant lawyer breached his duty by failing 
to timely file an answer on behalf of his client resulting in a 
default judgment. The client's motion to set aside the default was 
denied. The client then sued the lawyer, claiming the amount of 
the default judgment as damages. The Utah Supreme Court held that 
the plaintiff was not entitled to the default damages absent a 
showing of a "reasonable likelihood" of prevailing on the merits in 
the underlying action had the lawyer timely filed an answer. 
Clearly there was "but for" causation—but for the failure to file 
an answer, there would have been no default judgment. But the 
Supreme Court required more than "but for" causation. The Supreme 
Court ruled, as a matter of law, that a plaintiff in a legal 
malpractice action must prove proximate cause, and can only prove 
proximate cause if the plaintiff shows, in the absence of 
defendant's malpractice, there is a reasonable likelihood the 
plaintiff would have achieved the better legal or business result 
for which he sought damages. 765 P.2d at 889 
The Barber rule is clearly the rule in Utah. It was squarely 
applied by the Utah Supreme Court in Dunn, a decision before Barber 
which upheld a directed verdict for a defendant lawyer in a legal 
malpractice action. 584 P.2d at 897. In Dunn, the defendant 
lawyer committed legal malpractice when he failed to properly serve 
a summons and complaint on plaintiff's husband in Florida in 
connection with a divorce action in Utah in which plaintiff was 
seeking custody of her children. The plaintiff sought damages 
after losing custody in a Florida divorce action brought by her 
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husband. The plaintiff sought as damages the loss of custody of 
her children in the Florida divorce action and the cost of legal 
counsel in Florida. The Utah Supreme Court found that the lawyer's 
failure to properly serve the plaintiff's husband had delayed the 
Utah divorce proceeding, but ruled, as a matter of law, that 
plaintiff failed to show the likelihood of a better legal result if 
defendant had properly served the summons and complaint. In short, 
the Court found that proximate cause was too speculative: 
A finding of such damages cannot properly be based on 
speculation and conjecture. [Damages] can be awarded 
only if there is a basis in the evidence upon which 
reasonable minds acting fairly thereon could believe with 
reasonable certainty that [plaintiff's injury and damage 
were] proximately caused by the negligence of the 
defendant. 
584 P. 2d at 896. The Barber rule is not just the rule in Utah; it 
is followed in other jurisdictions as well. See Yusefzadeh, 932 
P.2d at 1265; Johnson, 652 P.2d at 655; Stansbery, 412 N.W.2d at 
452. 
Under Utah law, therefore, proximate cause in a legal 
malpractice action requires more than "but for" causation. It 
requires the plaintiff to show there is a "reasonable likelihood" 
that, absent the lawyer's malpractice, the plaintiff would have 
achieved the better business or legal result on which his damage 
claim is based. This rule limits a plaintiff's damages to those 
better business or legal results for which there is a reasonable 
likelihood such results could have been achieved by the client with 
proper representation. The "reasonable likelihood" rule bars the 
lawyer from simply being made a guarantor of the client's 
expectations by requiring that those expectations- be grounded in 
reality. 
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In t h i s case , P l a i n t i f f s presented no evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could find a reasonable l ike l ihood t h a t , in the 
absence of the Defendant lawyers7 claimed breach of duty, con f l i c t 
of i n t e r e s t , P l a i n t i f f s would have achieved the b e t t e r business 
r e s u l t for which they seek damages•19 Fundamentally, P l a i n t i f f s ' 
damage claim i s t h a t they would have succeeded in t h e i r Channel 13 
venture i f they had taken a d i f fe ren t course—if they had gone with 
CPL ins tead of Nor ths tar . (pis.' Br. at 17, 37-39.) P l a i n t i f f s a s s e r t 
t h i s claim even though they c l ea r ly knew of Wiley Rein ' s 
represen ta t ion of Northstar for four years and did nothing about 
i t . P l a i n t i f f s ' claim and i t s underlying assumptions are based on 
pure speculat ion and are contrary to the record. Speculation does 
not c rea te an issue of f ac t . See Tyger Constr. Co. v. Pensacola 
Constr. Co., 29 F.3d 137, 142-145 (4th Cir . 1994), c e r t , denied, 
115 S. Ct. 729 (1995); Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 999 F.2d 
549, 568-69 (D.D.C. 1993). 
If P l a i n t i f f s had not done the deal with Northstar and 
A l l s t a t e , the re i s absolute ly no showing P l a i n t i f f s would have 
acquired the Channel 13 l i c ense . The uncontroverted fact i s t h a t 
the acqu i s i t ion of the Channel 13 l icense i s the premise of a l l 
19. Spector v. Mermelstein, 485 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1973) i s not on point . 
Spector i s not a l ega l malpractice case involving claims of c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t , 
as in t h i s case . More importantly, in Spector the damages p l a i n t i f f s sought for 
the defendants' breach of duty , unlike t h i s case , were d i r e c t l y and 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y t i e d to the information the attorney did not d i s c l o s e . 
S p e c i f i c a l l y , the damages p l a i n t i f f claimed were the outstanding p r i n c i p l e and 
i n t e r e s t on a defaulted loan. The defendant attorney did not d i s c l o s e t o h i s 
c l i e n t that the debtor was in ser ious f inancia l d i f f i c u l t y , and did not have the 
a b i l i t y t o repay the loan. P l a i n t i f f , therefore , presented evidence from which 
a reasonable fact finder could conclude that , with t h i s information, i t was 
l i k e l y p l a i n t i f f would not have made the loan. 
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Plaintiffs' damage claims.20 (R. 7173, 7180-98.) Settling with the 
other applicants and having the financing to do that, therefore, 
are indisputably essential to those damage claims because 
Plaintiffs had lost their application for the Channel 13 license 
and could only have obtained the license by settling with the other 
applicants, (R. 3421-22; s^ e R. 5319-21, 7475-77.) 
There is no reasonable likelihood Plaintiffs would have 
obtained financing from any source, other than Northstar and 
Allstate, to acquire the license for Channel 13. Plaintiffs spent 
a year trying to find a partner to finance the settlements with the 
other competing applicants. Their efforts were unrestricted—Wiley 
Rein did nothing "to impede or hinder the plaintiffs' or Dow Lohnes 
& Albertson's attempt to find another purchaser or further 
financing ..." (Defs.' Add. Ex. 11 (vol. 11) at 45-46.) After a full year 
of working at it, the only offer Plaintiffs had which provided the 
money to buy out the competing applicants was the financing 
commitment from Northstar and Allstate in November 1986 for $6 
million in direct financing. Plaintiffs never had another offer or 
f i r m C o m m i t m e n t . (R. 3 6 4 9 , 5 4 4 7 - 4 8 , 7 0 8 0 , 7 2 8 4 - 8 7 , 7 4 8 1 - 8 7 , 7 5 0 8 - 0 9 , 7 8 0 6 , 8 2 7 8 -
9 1 ; J . Lee Dep . a t 1 8 9 - 9 3 ; D e f s . ' Add. Ex . 1 6 . ) 
The only other response that even amounted to a proposal was 
from CPL. Despite Plaintiffs' claims, however, the CPL proposal 
did not remotely begin to provide enough money to buy out the 
competing applicants. CPL proposed to put only $2 million of its 
own funds in the Channel 13 venture, not the $10 million Plaintiffs 
20. For example, Plaintiffs claim as damages the value of a 40% interest 
in the Channel 13 license in 1987, lost cash disbursements from Channel 13 from 
1987 through 1993, the value of 40% of the difference between the present fair-
market value of Channel 13 and the value in 1987, and the payments under 
Plaintiffs' employment contracts with Channel 13. Each of these damages is based 
on and assumes Plaintiffs acquired the Channel 13 license. (R. 7173, 7180-98.) 
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claim. Look at the CPL proposal. (R. 7080.) CPL'S proposed 
investment was $3 million less than required to pay the settlements 
alone, and $4 million less than the $6 million Northstar and 
Allstate committed to provide.21 Even Plaintiffs admit it would 
have taken $8 million to get the job done, (pis.' Br. at 23, 38.) If 
CPL only proposed to pay $2 million and that proposal was $3 
million short of paying for the settlements alone, there is no 
showing of a reasonable likelihood Plaintiffs would have acquired 
t h e l i c e n s e i n a d e a l W i t h CPL. (R. 3429-44 , 3649, 7204-30; D e f s . ' Add. Ex. 
8, 10, 1 3 - 1 4 . ) 
Furthermore Plaintiffs, with their own lawyer, Ralph Hardy, 
rejected the CPL "proposal" for other reasons—they did not trust 
one of the CPL principals and CPL wanted a 70% interest. They 
rejected the proposal while they knew Wiley Rein represented 
Northstar. Plaintiffs did not even attempt to reinstate the CPL 
proposal when Northstar allegedly changed the deal. Plaintiffs did 
not go back to CPL when there was an issue as to whether they 
wanted to purchase Channel 20. The fact is, Plaintiffs had no 
other financing alternative except the Northstar deal. (R. 5153-54, 
7277, 7284-85, 7471-82, 8278-84.) 
Moreover, Plaintiffs7 claim that they would have taken a 
different course of action is a self-serving conclusion and opinion 
that is contrary to the record.22 The breach of duty alleged here 
21. Furthermore, CPL also wanted to control the venture and wanted a larger 
ownership percentage than Northstar required. (R. 7284-85; Defs.' Add. Ex. 17.) 
Northstar received a 49% interest for its $6 million. (R. 3563.) 
22. Joseph Lee's conclusory opinion in his affidavit that Plaintiffs would 
have gone elsewhere had they know of Defendant lawyers' conflicts of interest, 
and Brent Pratt's conclusory opinion in his affidavit that Plaintiffs would have 
accepted CPL's "firm commitment to provide financing of $10 million or pursued 
other commitments" are self-serving conclusions and opinions without testimonial 
foundation and contrary to the record, and the Defendant lawyers moved to strike 
that testimony. (R. 7130-33, 7373-94.) 
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is based on the Defendant lawyers7 alleged failure to get 
Plaintiffs' informed consent, not on the Defendant lawyers' failure 
to tell Plaintiffs that Wiley Rein represented Northstar. 
Plaintiffs knew for over four years Wiley Rein represented 
Northstar in its dealings with Plaintiffs. All they had to do was 
look across the table. Plaintiffs knew and did nothing about it 
because they had their own lawyer, (R. 3412, 3558-70, 10458; Defs.' Add Ex. 
11 (Vol. I) at 227; id^ _ (Vol. II) at 7-8.) 
Plaintiffs acknowledged Wiley Rein informed them of the 
Northstar representation before Plaintiffs rejected the CPL 
proposal and entered into the MWT Ltd. Transaction. Joseph Lee's 
testimony proves this point. Lee testified Wood told him in the 
summer of 1986 that Wiley Rein was going to represent Northstar, 
but that Plaintiffs did not consent to that representation, (R. 4960-
63.) However, Plaintiffs did not fire Wiley Rein or get financing 
from someone other than Northstar. Instead, they went out and got 
their own lawyer, Dow Lohnes, to represent them in their dealings 
with Northstar. Dow Lohnes represented Plaintiffs from July 15, 
1986, until this action was filed, a period which includes 
Plaintiffs' rejection of the CPL proposal and consummation of the 
MWT Ltd. Transaction. These facts are indisputable and 
incontrovertible, and are established by Ralph Hardy's testimony, 
Dow Lohnes' billing records, Plaintiffs' payment of Dow Lohnes' 
legal bills totaling more than $300,000, and all the work Dow 
Lohnes performed, including the documents it drafted and reviewed. 
(See R. 3412-13, 3423-25, 3451, 3457-60, 3559, 3565-66, 3568-70, 3696-97, 3702-04, 
7282-83, 7451-8291, 8339-9495, 9624-777, 9827-954, 10054-248, 10458, 10694-95, 
10704, 10706, 10745-47, 10757, 10760-61, 10774, 10776, 10780-81, 10785, 10787-89, 
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10799-800, 10808-09 , 10862-64, 10883, 10903-04, 10981-82; D e f s . ' Add. Ex. 11 (Vol. 
I) a t 143-47 , 166, 195, 221-28; id^ a t (Vol. I I ) a t 7 - 8 , 19, 4 1 , 4 5 - 4 6 . ) 
B. AS A MATTER OF LAW, A PLAINTIFF REPRESENTED BY HIS OWN 
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL IN A TRANSACTION CANNOT PROVE ANY DAMAGES 
HE CLAIMS WERE PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY A CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
BREACH OF DUTY BY ANOTHER LAWYER. 
As a matter of law, a p l a i n t i f f represented by h i s own 
independent counsel in a t r ansac t ion cannot prove any damage he 
susta ined from t h a t t r ansac t ion was proximately caused by another 
a t t o r n e y ' s breach of duty for conf l i c t of i n t e r e s t . See Wilhelm v. 
Pray, P r i ce , Williams & Russel l , 231 Cal. Rptr. 355, 359 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1986); Purdy, 203 Cal. Rptr. a t 534-35; see a l so Hurlbert v. 
Gordon. 824 P.2d 1238, 1244-45 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); In r e W. 
Byron Schlaq, 96 B.R. 597, 601-602 (W.D. Pa. 1989).23 
The best au thor i ty for t h i s ru le i s P l a i n t i f f s ' own e t h i c s 
exper t , Ronald E. Mallen. Mr. Mallen in h i s t r e a t i s e acknowledges 
t h i s i s the r u l e : 
Although advice from other counsel does not excuse the 
ob l iga t ion of d i sc losure , def ic ienc ies in the adequacy of the 
d i sc losure by the lawyer may be overcome where the c l i e n t had 
the ass i s t ance of independent counsel. In f ac t , t he re does 
not appear to be any c i v i l damage act ion in which an a t torney 
was held l i a b l e for the consequences of represen t ing 
conf l i c t i ng i n t e r e s t s where the c l i e n t received advice from an 
independent lawyer. 
Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 12.13 a t 
730 (3d ed. 1989) (emphasis supplied) .24 
23. P l a i n t i f f s ' cases are not c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t cases and are not t o the 
contrary. The Defendant lawyers do not claim Dow Lohnes was neg l i gen t , or that 
Dow Lohnes' negl igence caused P l a i n t i f f s ' damage, which i s the s i t u a t i o n in the 
cases c i t e d by P l a i n t i f f s , par t i cu lar ly , Cline v. Watkins, 135 Cal. Rptr. 838, 
66 Cal. App. 3d 174, 176 (1977). See a l so au thor i t i e s c i t e d at pp. 44-45 of 
P l a i n t i f f s ' Brief . Here, P l a i n t i f f s were represented by very able lawyers t o 
whom they looked for guidance and advice in each of the t ransac t ions . 
24. The testimony P l a i n t i f f s c i t e d of Mr. Mallen as t h e i r expert in t h i s 
case i s nothing more than inadmissible speculat ion and conjecture without any 
t e s t imonia l foundation and i s contrary to Mr. Mallen's own t r e a t i s e . 
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The rational for this rule is that the plaintiff's own lawyer 
provides precisely what the plaintiff has been deprived of by 
reason of an improper conflict—independent legal services and 
advice. The plaintiff, therefore, has not been caused any injury 
as a result of improper conflict. In a commercial transaction, a 
party's primary protection comes from the representation provided 
by its own attorney. See Wilhelm, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 358-59; see 
also Hurlbert, 824 P.2d at 1245. 
Plaintiffs had their own lawyer in each of the business 
transactions of which Plaintiffs complain and for which they seek 
damages. Dow Lohnes and Ralph Hardy represented Plaintiffs as 
their lawyer. No reasonable juror could find to the contrary. 
The fact Dow Lohnes represented Plaintiffs as lawyers in each 
of the transactions is established by the testimony of Ralph Hardy, 
Dow Lohnes' billing records, Plaintiffs7 payment of those legal 
fees, Dow Lohnes' work product including correspondence stating Dow 
Lohnes represented Plaintiffs, and the testimony of every 
participant in these transactions except some Plaintiffs who claim 
Ralph Hardy was acting only as a financial advisor to the Foulgers 
in the MWT Ltd. Transaction. Even Plaintiff Clayton Foulger 
admitted Dow Lohnes was acting as a lawyer at the November 1986 
face-to-face negotiations and helped draft the agreements, (see R. 
7878.) 
Dow Lohnes is a law firm and Hardy is a lawyer. The only 
business, occupation and profession in which they are engaged is 
the practice of law. Dow Lohnes and Ralph Hardy do not give 
financial advice. In the lower court there were over 200 exhibits 
showing Dow Lohnes, as lawyers, represented Plaintiffs, (see R. 7451-
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8294, 8339-9495, 9624-777, 9827-9954, 10054-248, 10862-64, 10883, 10903-04, 10981-
82.) Hardy, a "good friend" of David Lee and the Foulgers, testified 
all the work he did in connection with Channel 13 was as a lawyer: 
Q. Mr. Hardy, at any time either before or after the filing 
of the Complaint in this action, did you ever tell David Lee 
that you had performed work or services for anyone relating to 
Channel 13 or to matters involving Channel 13 in any capacity 
other than as a lawyer? 
A. No. 
Q. You7re sure of that? 
A. All of my — All of my involvement with Channel 13 was as 
a lawyer. 
(R. 7469-70.) 
In the face of this record, the lower court properly ruled 
that there was no genuine issue of fact as to whether Dow Lohnes 
and Hardy represented Plaintiffs as lawyers in each of the business 
transactions of which Plaintiffs complain and seek damages. Merely 
controverting a fact does not create a genuine issue of material 
fact. 
For there to be a genuine issue of material fact, a plaintiff 
must present evidence from which a reasonable juror could find for 
the plaintiff. Simply presenting "some evidence," as Plaintiffs 
did here, is not enough. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. , 509 U.S. , 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 484 (1993) ("in the event the 
trial court concludes that the scintilla of evidence presented 
supporting a position is insufficient to allow a reasonable juror 
to conclude that the position more likely than not is true, the 
court remains free to direct a judgment . . . and likewise to grant 
summary judgment . . .) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 251 (1986)(reaffirming from previous cases the concept that 
"in every case, before the evidence is left to the jury, there is 
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a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is 
literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury 
could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing 
it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.11).25 
The fact Plaintiffs had their own lawyer in every one of the 
business transactions of which Plaintiffs complain and seek damages 
is an independent ground for determining no proximate cause and 
affirming the lower court's decision. However, even if the Court 
were to hold that, because of Plaintiffs' testimony, there is a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether Dow Lohnes and Ralph Hardy 
represented Plaintiffs, which there is not, there is still no 
genuine issue of fact on the issue of proximate cause. 
P. THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED UTAH'S RULES OF PROXIMATE 
CAUSE IN AWARDING DEFENDANT LAWYERS SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The lower court correctly applied Utah's rules of proximate 
cause in awarding summary judgment for the Defendant lawyers. 
Plaintiffs really admit that. Plaintiffs admit that the District 
Court correctly applied Utah's rule of proximate cause because, for 
the first time on this appeal, Plaintiffs contend that this Court 
should adopt a new rule of proximate cause in breach of fiduciary 
duty cases. Plaintiffs claim that there is a different rule, a 
more liberal rule, of proximate cause in breach of fiduciary duty 
cases than in negligence cases. Plaintiffs propose a "chain of 
events" or a "different course of action" rule of proximate cause. 
25. This is not a case where the lower court impermissibly weighed two sets 
of conflicting affidavits as the court did in Draper City v. Bernardo, 256 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah January 19, 1995). Here, Plaintiffs, after two years of 
discovery, presented insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could 
find for Plaintiffs. 
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Essentially, Plaintiffs propose a "things would have been 
different" rule. (See Pis.' Br. at 17, 23-25, 40.) 
Plaintiffs7 proposed rule is not the law, and would not make 
good law. First, Utah Supreme Court authority holds that proximate 
cause in breach of fiduciary duty cases requires not only "but 
for," but "substantial" causation, and "substantial" causation 
requires a showing of a reasonable likelihood that, in the absence 
of the lawyer's alleged breach of duty, a plaintiff would have 
achieved the better business or legal result for which the 
plaintiff seeks damages. Those are Utah's rules of proximate 
cause, rules applied in breach of fiduciary duty legal malpractice 
cases. See Barber, 765 P.2d at 889; Dunn 584 P.2d at 896-97; see 
also Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 245-46; Fausett, 542 F. Supp. at 1240. 
Second, the uniform rule is that the rules for proximate cause 
are the same for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and even 
intentional torts. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 & cmt. e 
(1965); Prosser § 41; Holmes, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 556 (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Fausett, 542 F. Supp. at 1240. Indeed, a fiduciary's 
breach of the duty of care — negligence — is a breach of a 
fiduciary duty. See Barber, 765 P. 2d at 889; Dunn 584 P. 2d at 896-
97; Restatement (Second) of Agency § 379 & cmt. b (1965). 
In fact, the Restatement explicitly rejects any distinction 
between the standard of proximate cause in negligence cases and the 
standard of proximate cause in other tort cases. Section 431 of 
the Restatement of Torts squarely provides: 
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to 
another if 
(a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about 
the harm, and 
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(b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from 
liability because of the manner in which he negligence has 
resulted in the harm. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431 (1965) . Comment "e" to that 
provision explicitly states: 
Although the rules stated in this section are stated in terms 
of the actor's negligent conduct, they are equally applicable 
where the conduct is intended to cause harm, or where it is 
such as to result in strict liability. 
Id. § 431 cmt. e; accord id. § 874 & cmt. b (fiduciary liable for 
harm resulting from breach of duty in accordance with § 910); id. 
§ 910 (one injured by another's tort entitled to damages for harm 
"legally caused" by tort). 
Plaintiffs7 "chain of events" or "different course of action" 
rule of proximate cause, moreover, would thwart the fundamental 
policy behind the requirement of proximate cause. The policy of 
proximate cause requires a substantial causal connection between 
fault and damage before the risk of loss is shifted on the basis of 
fault. Tort law is not simply a morality play, a lecture on legal 
ethics; it requires that damages only be awarded on the basis of 
fault when the fault is a substantial cause of a plaintiff's 
damage. To do otherwise would allow recovery on the basis of 
remoteness and speculation. 
That is precisely what Plaintiffs' new rule does. It would be 
the very antithesis of proximate cause. It would subject lawyers 
to large damage awards, not on the basis of whether their fault 
caused the damage, but on the basis of speculation and the 
potential prejudice of juries against lawyers. It is a huge and 
unwarranted risk to impose upon the legal profession. Plaintiffs' 
new rule would make lawyers the guarantors of their clients' 
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business and legal expectations regardless of whether the lawyer's 
fault substantially caused a plaintiff harm and regardless of 
whether there was any reasonable likelihood that, in the absence of 
the lawyer's fault, the plaintiff would have realized the better 
result for which he claims damages. 
Plaintiffs' new rule is just a new version of Mother Goose's 
Nursery Rhyme No. 191—"For want of a nail . . . the kingdom was 
lost."26 It is a nice rhyme, but a bad rule of proximate cause, 
and the United States Supreme Court has said so. 
Life is too short to pursue every human act to its most remote 
consequences; "for want of a nail a kingdom was lost" is a 
commentary on fate, not the statement of a major cause of 
action against a blacksmith. 
117 L. Ed. 2d at 556 (Scalia, J., concurring). It is also a rule 
that has consistently been rejected by the courts and legal 
commentators. See Mitchell, 697 P. 2d at 246; Dunn, 584 P. 2d at 
896; Hawaii Corp. v. Crossley, 567 F. Supp. 609, 630-31 (D. Hawaii 
1983); Smith v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 749 P.2d 462, 464 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1987); Prosser § 41; Robert Cooter, Torts as the 
Union of Liberty & Efficiency: An Essay on Causation, 63 Chicago-
Kent L. Rev. 523 (1987); Continuing Legal Education: Another 
Important Tort Basic, 12 Cal. Lawyer 63 (Nov. 1992). 
The New York rule Plaintiffs cite from Milbank, Tweed, Hadley 
& McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 1994), is distinguishable 
26. The entire rhyme reads: 
FOR WANT of A NAIL the shoe was lost, 
For want of the shoe, the horse was lost, 
For want of the horse, the rider was lost, 
For want of the rider, the battle was lost, 
For want of the battle, the kingdom was lost, 
And for the want of a horse-shoe nailI 
Mother Goose's Nursery Rhymes 191 (Walter Jerrold Ed, Alfred A. Knopf Inc. 
1993)(1903). 
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from this case both in terms of legal doctrine and facts. Milbank 
is a case applying New York, not Utah, law. The Milbank court 
applied a New York rule in which "but for" causation is not 
required in corporate or principal opportunity cases. The New York 
rule is a rule of restitutional damage. That is not the law in 
Utah. Utah does not loosen the "normally stringent requirements of 
causation and damages" in breach of fiduciary duty cases. See 
Barber, 765 P.2d at 889; Dunn. 584 P.2d at 896. 
Milbank also is distinguishable factually. Milbank is a 
corporate or principal opportunity case. This case is not. In 
Milbank, the lawyer promised in writing that once a conflict arose, 
the lawyer would not represent the client's former agent. The 
lawyer then broke that promise and joined the former agent in: 
(1) using the client's funds to take the clients opportunity; (2) 
misusing the client's confidential information to do so; and (3) 
joining with the former agent in making the deal possible that 
deprived the client of a profitable business opportunity. The 
lawyer was simply a joint tort-feasor with the former agent and 
liable with the agent for the opportunity they usurped.27 
Finally, Plaintiffs' new standard of proximate cause is 
based on a number of fallacious assertions. For example, 
Plaintiffs' assertion that "the breach itself may create 
circumstances which prevent the client from establishing the 
27. The other authorities Plaintiffs cite likewise are not on point. The 
sections of the Restatement of Agency Plaintiffs cite have nothing to do with 
causation or the type of damages Plaintiffs claim. Those sections either relate 
to an agent's duty (§§ 387-398), or the remedies available for breach of duty 
including nominal damages, discharge and disgorgement of profits (§§ 399-407). 
Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969) and Abkco Music Inc. v. 
Harrisonas Music Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983), simply stand for the 
proposition that an agent must disgorge any profit or opportunity it gained at 
the principal's expense in violation of the agent's fiduciary duties. 
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'reasonable likelihood' of a better result" is fallacious. 
Plaintiffs had a duty to show a reasonable likelihood of success 
and, clearly in this case, nothing prevented them from doing that. 
Plaintiffs may dispute that they consented to Wiley Rein's 
representation of Northstar, but the record clearly shows they knew 
of that representation and retained their own counsel who 
represented them in their search for a financing partner and 
dealings with Northstar. 
Plaintiffs' assertion that "strict 'but for' causation and 
claims based on breach of fiduciary duty is conceptually 
inconsistent with the purpose of the remedy" is also fallacious. 
That is not the law in Utah, and the fact Plaintiffs need to avoid 
the "but for" and "reasonable likelihood" standard demonstrates 
there is no proximate cause. 
Finally, Plaintiffs' assertion that "the applicable standard 
requires Plaintiffs to show only that the course of action they 
took resulted in loss, and that Defendants' breaches were 'a 
substantial factor' in leading plaintiffs to take that course of 
action" is fallacious. This standard is handmade by Plaintiffs in 
this case, and has never been advanced or accepted by any court, 
including those in the cases Plaintiffs cite. 
G. THERE WAS NO USE OR MISUSE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. 
Legally and factually, Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate any 
use or misuse of confidential information by the Defendant lawyers. 
First, Plaintiffs' claim that there is an irrebuttable presumption 
of receipt and misuse of confidential information simply is not the 
law. Plaintiffs deliberately attempt to confuse a motion to 
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disqualify with a civil legal malpractice action for damages.28 
(see pis.' Br. at 3, 85-86.) In a legal malpractice action, unlike a 
motion to disqualify, no presumption exists. In a legal 
malpractice action, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the lawyer had 
confidential information; and (2) that confidential information was 
misused. See R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice §§ 12.16, 
13.23 (3d ed. 1989). 
Second, there is absolutely no factual showing the Defendant 
lawyers used or misused any confidential information. The 
Defendant lawyers put in a clear record that they never used or 
misused any confidential information. Plaintiffs never 
controverted or contradicted that record and never pointed to one 
piece of confidential information that was used or misused by the 
Defendant lawyers in their representation of Northstar.29 
Plaintiffs' claim of use and misuse is simply a sideshow to cover-
up their inability to show proximate cause.30 (R. 3390-92, 3413, 3424, 
3453, 3560-61, 3698-99.) 
28. The law is, in motions to disqualify, there is an irrebuttable 
presumption the lawyer received relevant confidential information where the two 
matters are substantially factually related. However, even in motions to 
disqualify, there is no presumption of misuse. The only cases Plaintiffs cite, 
Brown v. Board, of Zoning Adj., 486 A.2d 37 (D.C. 1984), and Abkco Music, Inc. 
v. Harrisonqs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1988) are not to the contrary. 
Brown is a disqualification case. In Abkco, the agent admitted he had used and 
misused confidential information, and the language which Plaintiffs quote 
demonstrates that point: "Klein himself acknowledged at trial that his offers 
. . . were based, at least in part, on knowledge he had acquired as Harrison's 
business manager . . . " (Pis.' Br. at 48.) 
29. Plaintiffs' claim of use and misuse of confidential information is 
nothing more than inadmissible speculation and conjecture for which there is no 
testimonial foundation, including the testimony they quote from their expert, Ron 
Mallen. 
30. The fact there was no use or misuse of confidential information may 
well go to breach of duty instead of proximate cause. In any event, if there was 
no use or misuse, it did not proximately cause any damage with regard to the 
damages Plaintiffs claim. 
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Not only was there no showing of use or misuse, there was no 
showing the Defendant lawyers even had any confidential information 
regarding Plaintiffs.31 No lawyer representing Northstar had any 
confidential information, and Barry Wood testified that he knew of 
no confidential information he had regarding Plaintiffs at the time 
of the MWT Ltd. Transaction. (R. 3390-92, 3413, 3424.) It was 
uncontroverted that Northstar and Allstate got all their 
information regarding Plaintiffs from only two sources—the public 
record before the FCC, and from Plaintiffs as they attempted to 
persuade those companies to finance the Channel 13 venture, (R. 3453, 
3560-6i# 3698-99.) Plaintiffs have not pointed to one piece of 
information that was not part of the public record, or that they 
did not give directly to Lincoln, Glakas and Renze. Finally, 
Lincoln and Hardy testified, as a matter of common business 
practice, no one would have entered into the MWT Ltd. Transaction 
with Mountain West without knowledge of the Mountain West Partners7 
financial position, their business plans or the terms and 
conditions of the settlement agreements that were being financed. 
(R. 3561 , 7531-32 . ) 
Consequently, P l a i n t i f f s ' a s se r t ion t h a t the t r i a l court 
"overlooked the fact t h a t misuse of conf ident ia l information was a 
separa te breach from Defendants7 breach of du t i e s of l oya l ty , f u l l 
d i sc losure and informed consent11 i s f l a t wrong. The fac t i s , the 
lower court properly ruled there was "no showing the Defendant 
31. P l a i n t i f f s general ly s tated that the Defendant lawyers obtained 
"detai led f inanc ia l information concerning the partners' personal background, 
experience , f inanc ia l capab i l i t y , business a c t i v i t i e s , market information, 
s trengths and weaknesses, s tart -up and programming s t r a t e g i e s and other matters . 
They a l so gave the Firm the i r personal f inanc ia l statements, which showed that 
the [Mountain West] Partners had l imited f inanc ia l s trength ." (See P i s . ' Br. at 
3, 48 . ) 
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lawyers breached their professional duties to Plaintiffs by using, 
misusing, or abusing any confidential information of Plaintiffs on 
any occasion." (pis.' Add. Ex. 3, at 2.) 
XI. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact on 
the essential element of proximate cause. Every element in the 
seven transactions of which Plaintiffs complain and seek damages 
was the product and result of the decisions and directions of 
Northstar and Allstate, non-party business entities, and not the 
Defendant lawyers. It is indisputable Plaintiffs had their own 
independent counsel in all the transactions between Plaintiffs, 
Northstar and Allstate. Plaintiffs failed to show any reasonable 
likelihood that, absent the alleged breach of duty, conflict of 
interest, they would have obtained the better business results for 
which they claim damage. Plaintiffs7 proposed new rule of 
proximate cause in breach of fiduciary duty cases is not the law in 
Utah, and would base the requisite causal connection between fault 
and damage on speculation and remoteness. The District Court's 
summary judgment on the essential element of proximate cause, 
therefore, should be affirmed. ^^^.^^ 
DATED: May |S_, 1995. \ j ^ * ^ ^ f e ^ 
By: fQff) ^^ y£J l * *~ 
Peggy'A. Tomsic 
BERMAN, GAUFIN & TOMSIC 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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